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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The cigarette industry has been the subject of an enormous amount of research in 
economics. One need only look at the immense variation in cigarette consumption over time 
to understand the impetus for such endeavors. The industry has been the subject of 
government regulation and taxation for about the last thirty years. A look at the total annual 
and per capita cigarette consumption rates and the percentage change in per capita rates from 
year to year will serve as an illuminating backdrop for the research issues at hand. The data 
for cigarette consumption over the last ninety-five years are summarized graphically in 
Figures 1.1 through 1.3. The data are taken from the 1996, Tobacco Situation and Outlook 
Report. 
An examination of Figxires 1.1 through 1.3 reveals that perhaps the most obvious 
trend is the rapid increase in cigarette consiunption since the 1900s. A perusal of the graphs 
shows that there have always been fluctuations in consumption levels from year to year. 
However, there has been a significant drop in per capita cigarette consumption since the mid-
1960s and a drop in total cigarette consumption since the late 1970s. These negative trends 
have been attributed, in part, to a spate of health information about cigarettes that was 
publicized in the late sixties and the early seventies. The health warnings culminated with 
reports about the addictive nature of nicotine by the Surgeon General in 1979. This 
information is summarized in Table 1.1. Furthermore, according to the Surgeon General's 
Report (1986), cigarette smoking is the leading preventable cause of premature death and 
disability in the U.S. 
Any economic analysis of cigarette smoking should possess an understanding of the 
reasons why consumers choose to smoke. The following is a brief summary of the 
motivation to smoke cigarettes. As Mullahy (1985) contends, consumers would not smoke 
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unless they experienced some benefits from consuming cigarettes. A better understanding of 
the process that generates these benefits is elucidated by Ashton and Stepney (1982). They 
maintain that cigarette smoking is desirable to some consumers because it produces pleasure 
or alleviates discomfort. 
The specific mechanism by which cigarette smoke produces pleasure or alleviates 
discomfort can be broken down into nonpharmacological and pharaiacological factors. 
Nonpharmacological factors refer to pleasure being generated from the smell and taste of 
smoking cigarettes. On the other hand, pharmacological factors describe the bio-chemical 
process through which cigarettes produce pleasure or alleviate discomfort. Ashton and 
Stepney maintain that smokers consume cigarettes primarily because of the pharmacological 
aspects of nicotine. They claim that cigarettes are smoked in order to deliver desirable 
amounts of nicotine to the user, hi order to support this claim, they cite evidence of studies 
that report smokers who modify their behavior when smoking cigarettes that contain less 
nicotine. Smokers who consume low-nicotine cigarettes have been reported to take longer 
Table 1.1 A Timeline of Health Warnings Regarding Cigarette Smoking 
Year Health Warnings 
1953 American Cancer Society & British Medical Research 
Council's report on increased mortality rates due to smoking 
1964 U.S. Surgeon General's Report linking smoking to cancer 
1965 Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act stipulates that health 
warnings are to be printed on packs 
1968 F.C.C. Fairness Doctrine requires that one free anti-smoking 
commercial be aired for every four industry commercials 
1971 Ban on all broadcast cigarette advertising 
1979 Surgeon General's Report stating that cigarettes are addictive 
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and more frequent puffs and to inhale deeply in order to ingest the desired level of nicotine. 
They identify nicotine as the primary reinforcing agent in cigarette smoke. 
The pharmacological process begins with the inhalation of cigarette smoke containing 
nicotine into the limgs. Upon absorption into the bloodstream, nicotine is rapidly delivered 
to most tissues that enjoy a copious blood supply. This includes the brain. Upon crossing 
the blood-brain barrier, nicotine emulates the natural neurotransmitter acetylcholine and 
bonds with the receptors in the nervous system. Nicotine is a biphasic drug because in small 
doses it acts as a stimulant whereas in larger doses it blocks the receptors and acts as a 
depressant. Thus, by varying the length and frequency of puffs, a smoker can use a cigarette 
to alleviate stress or to induce pleasure. 
Cigarettes have been characterized as an addictive good. There are several definitions 
of addiction. In keeping with Chaloupka (1991), it is assumed that addiction refers to the 
simultaneous presence of reinforcement, tolerance and withdrawal. Ashton and Stepney 
describe reinforcement as a psychological mechanism whereby a behavior is influenced by 
its consequences. The size and frequency of the rewards associated with a given behavior 
influence the occurrence of that behavior. In other words, the more a person smokes, the 
more her body leams to relax or calm down in response to smoking. The U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (1982) states that tolerance refers to the practice of using 
increasing amounts of a substance to provide the original level of satisfaction. As cigarette 
smokers continue to smoke, they need larger doses of nicotine in order to achieve a given 
level of satisfaction. The increase in dosage is bounded because in large doses nicotine 
blocks the receptors. Furthermore, in its purest form a very small dose of nicotine can be 
lethal. Shiffinan (1979) describes the symptoms of withdrawal as an intense craving for 
tobacco accompanied by weight gain, irritability and loss of sleep. 
The addiction process begins with the experience of pleasurable sensations due to 
nicotine intake. It progresses further with the establishment of reinforcing effects. 
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Continued use of cigarettes causes the body to develop a tolerance to nicotine whereby larger 
doses are required to maintain satisfaction levels. Finally, the body gets accustomed to a 
fixed amount of nicotine and any attempt to reduce this amount results in the acute 
discomfort of withdrawal. It is at this stage that the smoker is hooked. 
On July 19, 1995 the Journal of the American Medical Association published an 
article which alleged that the British American Tobacco Company and the Williamson 
Tobacco Corporation had learned about the addictive nature of nicotine in the early 1960s. 
Glantz et al. (1995). They go on to say that the U.S. Surgeon General did not leam about the 
addictive nature of nicotine until 1979. The following is a quote from this article: 
By the early 1960s the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) and 
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation (B&W) had developed a 
sophisticated understanding of nicotine pharmacology and knew that nicotine 
was pharmacologically addictive. Publicly however, the tobacco industry has 
maintained and continues to maintain that nicotine is not addictive. The 
scientific community was much slower to appreciate nicotine addiction; the 
Surgeon General did not conclude that nicotine was addictive until 1979. 
On April 1, 1994 the New York Times reported that Phillip Morris blocked a 1983 
research report which concluded that nicotine was an addictive substance. Hilts (1994). Five 
years later, nicotine was again confirmed to be an addictive substance in a Surgeon General's 
report (1988) entitled The Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction. In recent 
times the cigarette industry has been in the press quite often. Several states in the U.S. are 
currently suing firms in the tobacco industry in order to recover health costs incurred by 
smokers. For example, the March 21, 1997 Pes Moines Register reports that the state of 
Iowa is suing tobacco firms for violating the state's consumer fraud act by failing to disclose 
the dangers of smoking and the addictive quahties of nicotine, Vedantam (1997). The report 
goes on to say that the manufacturers of Chesterfield cigarettes, the Liggett Group, admitted 
in court that cigarettes are addictive and that the industry targets teenagers for sales. The 
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Liggett group has also turned over hundreds of documents on industry-wide discussions 
about the dangers of nicotine and marketing strategies. Given the efforts of the tobacco 
industry to conceal addiction information from the general public, a study of the impact of 
addiction information on cigarette demand is warranted. The results from such an 
investigation would not only be of interest to participants in the various lawsuits but also to 
policy makers whose goal is to reduce cigarette smoking. 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of addiction information on 
the demand for cigarettes. This objective is accomplished and summarized by the procedures 
described in the chapters to follow. Chapter 2 begins with a systematic review of the 
theoretical models that explain the demand for addictive goods. The Becker and Murphy 
rational addiction model (1988) is identified as a relevant starting point for the theoretical 
model used in this study. Chapter 3 generalizes this model to generate the demand for both 
addictive and non-addictive goods and derives testable imphcations about the impact of 
addiction information on cigarette demand. Chapter 4 describes the collection of the data set, 
operationalizes the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 and discusses the relevant 
econometric procedures that will be used to estimate the model. Chapter 5 presents the 
econometric results and discusses their economic implications. Finally, Chapter 6 
summarizes the current research effort and suggests directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An Overview of the Economic Aspects of Cigarettes 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature relevant for the implications of 
the impact of addiction information on cigarette demand. There is a vast literature on the 
economic aspects of cigarettes. This literature can be loosely classified into three main 
branches. The demand side, the supply side and the literature on the health costs attributable 
to cigarette smoking. The current chapter will investigate the demand side of the literature at 
length. 
The supply side literatiure focuses on issues of market structure and the behavior of a 
firm supplying an addictive good. In a very recent example, Bamett, Keeler and Hu (1995) 
develop a model of ohgopoly price behavior and tax incidence for the U.S. cigarette industry. 
They find that competition among manufacturers has been decreasing since 1980. Also, 
Fethke and Jagannathan (1996) examine the behavior of consiraiption and price given that 
imperfectly competitive producers face consumers with different intensities of habit 
persistence. 
The health cost literature focuses on the health costs of smoking to the smoker and to 
society at large. An example of this type of work is provided by Rice et al. (1986) who 
investigate the costs resulting from the health effects of smoking. They include expenditures 
for medical care and the value of lost output due to disability and premature mortality among 
cigarette smokers. The authors also do a comparative analysis of the utilization of medical 
care of smokers versus non-smokers. 
The demand side is arguably the largest branch of the literature on cigarette smoking. 
Under this heading, one would group a plethora of issues such as: competing models of 
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cigarette demand, the impact of excise taxes on cigarette smuggling, the importance of 
advertising on cigarette demand and the impact of health information on cigarette 
consumption. The next section will review studies that model the impact of the release of 
health information on cigarette demand. Ideally, a review of studies on the impact of 
information about addiction on cigarette demand would be desirable. However, since a 
literature search did not reveal any such studies, a review of the cigarette health information 
Uterature is relevant. After discussing the cigarette health information literature, this chapter 
turns to competing microeconomic models of cigarette demand. Finally, there is a detailed 
review of studies that discuss the development of the rational addiction model and its 
apphcation to the cigarette industry. 
Health Information Shocks and Cigarette Demand 
Schneider, BClein and Murphy (1981) claim that the earliest example of public 
awareness about the health effects of cigarette smoking occurred in 1953 when the American 
Cancer Society and the British Medical Research Council pubUshed a report which stated 
that smokers had a higher death rate than non-smokers. Public interest in the health effects 
of smoking was further stimulated by the 1964 Surgeon General's Report which linked 
smoking to cancer. In 1965 the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act stipulated that health 
warnings were to be printed on cigarette packs. In 1968 the Federal Communication 
Commission's Fairness Doctrine required that one free anti-smoking commercial be aired for 
every four industry commercials on broadcast media. Finally, in 1971 all cigarette 
commercials were banned from the broadcast media. In 1979 another Surgeon General's 
report was published that supported the 1964 report and extended the link between cigarette 
smoking and various diseases. This report was also the first time that a Surgeon General's 
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report discussed the addictive properties of nicotine. It is the impact of such events on 
cigarette consumption that are the subjects of the articles to which we now turn. 
Economists in the 1970s were interested in investigating the impact of the above 
events on cigarette demand. The general methodology employed was to treat cigarettes as a 
non-addictive good and to model cigarette demand as a fimction of prices, income and a 
series of dummy variables that captured health scare or policy effects. Cigarette demand was 
not modeled as a fimction of either past or future prices. In other words, the early models 
treated consumers as naive agents that consumed cigarettes in a static framework without 
considering either the impact of the addictive nature of the good on future consimiption or 
the dependence of current consumption patterns on past behavior. The initial work in the 
field tried to estimate the impact of taxes, advertising and health scares on the quantity 
demanded and on the elasticity of demand for cigarettes. 
James Hamilton (1972) was one of the first to address ±e issue of the impact of 
health warnings on cigarette consumption and is extensively quoted in the literature. 
Hamilton states that when it comes to curtailing consumption, the health scare effect is 
relatively more powerful than the ban on cigarette advertising in the broadcast media. He 
uses data from 1925-1970 to model cigarette demand as a fimction of a wholesale price 
index, advertising expenditures and a series of dimmiy variables to capture health scare and 
policy effects. The dummy variables represent the 1953 American Cancer Society's Report, 
1964 Surgeon General's Report and the 1968 anti-smoking campaign. Advertising was 
assumed to have a geometric lag structiu-e. The demand function was estimated for both 
linear and log-linear specifications, using a couple of different advertising indices and for 
various time periods. Hamilton used his regression coefficients to make predictions at the 
mean. He found that the health scare was several times more powerful as a deterrent than 
advertising was as a stimulant. The linear estimates show that advertising boosts per capita 
consumption by 95 cigarettes per year, the 1964 Surgeon General's warning depressed per 
12 
capita consumption by 252.9 cigarettes at the mean and antismoking commercials depressed 
per capita cigarette consumption by 530.7 units on average. 
Several other studies followed Hamilton's research. Atkinson and Skegg (1973) 
examined the health scare question in the context of the UJC. They find that publicity 
concerning the harmful effects of tobacco has the effect of causing a sudden fall in 
consumption with a gradual return to the old level. Warner (1977) investigated the impact of 
the anti-smoking campaign on cigarette consumption, ffis results suggest that health 
warnings cause immediate but transitory decreases in cigarette consumption, whereas the 
cumulative effect of pubhcity is substantially greater in deterring consumption. Witt and Pass 
(1981) find for the U.S. and the U.K. that, while advertising tends to increase cigarette 
consumption, health scares decrease consumption by a small but significant amount of about 
3-7% a year and in the subsequent year following the year of the health scare. They find that 
cigarette advertising expenditiures in 1962 and 1963 would need to be doubled in order to 
effectively neutralize the effects of the 1962 health scare. 
Baltagi and Levin (1986) have also been quoted extensively in this literature. Their 
panel data study examines the effects of bootlegging and cigarette taxation and finds mild 
support for the effectiveness of anti-smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption. 
Bishop and Yoo (1985) use neoclassical microeconomic theory to identify the interactions 
between cigarette demand and supply. They then use a three stage least squares estimation 
procedure to evaluate the effects of cigarette taxes, advertising, the advertising ban and health 
scare on the industry's output. They find that demand is inelastic while supply is elastic. The 
authors also discovered that the impact of taxes was substantially larger than the impact of 
either the health scare or the television ban on cigarette advertising. Finally, they report that 
advertising increased cigarette demand only slightly. 
The Federal Trade Commission was also actively involved in investigating the impact 
of cigarette health information on smoking. Ippolito, Murphy and Sant (1979) authored a 
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Federal Trade Commission report that was devoted to investigating consumer responses to 
cigarette health information. Their study provides an examination of the nature and extent of 
consumer reactions to the following health scares and pohcy changes: the health publicity of 
the 1950's; the 1964 Surgeon General's Report; the 1965 and 1970 cigarette package 
labeling regulations; the 1968-1971 anti-smoking commercials and the television and radio 
advenising ban of 1971. The authors find that Surgeon General's Report of 1964 affected 
per capita consumption very gradually. They found a drop in per capita cigarette 
consumption of about 3.5 percent a year fi"om 1964-1975. They also found that the anti-
smoking commercials were not very effective in intensifying the decline in per capita 
smoking rates. The authors also noted that the drop in smoking rates due to the publicity in 
the 1950's was primarily due to a reduction in the intensity of smokers' habits whereas the 
decline in smoking rates after the 1964 Surgeon General's Report was due to fewer adults 
smoking while the average number of cigarettes consumed by existing smokers remained 
unchanged. 
Schneider, Klein and Murphy (1981) also investigated the impact of the 1953 and 
1964 health scares on per capita cigarette consumption. However, they employ a notably 
different approach. They claim that the effectiveness of health warnings about the dangers of 
smoking can be observed by monitoring the rise in the consumption of low-tar and filter­
tipped cigarettes. They also appear to be the first to model the impact of advertising via two 
stock variables, one for the pre-advertising ban period and one for the post-ban period. They 
use a double-log model to study per capita cigarette demand as a function of the retail price 
of cigarettes, per capita real income, two stocks of advertising, a dummy for the fairness 
doctrine period, the percentage of filter-tip cigarettes, the percentage of low-tar cigarettes, the 
average annual amount of tobacco per cigarette and an income instrument to model trend 
effects. The authors find that the total effect of the 1953 and 1964 health shocks is a forty-
seven percent decline in per capita cigarette consumption by 1978. 
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Blaine and Reed (1994) provide a more recent attempt to model the impact of health 
information on cigarette demand. They model per capita cigarette consumption as a linear 
function of retail price, per capita income, the proportion of the adult population in the peak 
smoking group and the proportion of cigarettes sold with filter-tip and low tar and nicotine. 
They also include dummy variables that decay geometrically to model the impact of the 
1954, 1964 and 1971 health scare events. Their results indicate that the invention of filter­
tipped cigarettes have had a significant impact on consumption patterns. However, the low-
tar and nicotine variables do not seem to mitigate the effects of the various health scares in 
their model. 
All the studies reviewed seem to agree that the 1953 and 1964 health scares are 
significant in affecting cigarette consumption. However, the empirical evidence is mixed 
when it comes to the magnitude of the health scare effects as compared to the impact of the 
cigarette advertising ban of 1971. The literature also suggests that excise taxes are an 
important tool in curbing cigarette consumption. The only area of disagreement appears to 
be the impact of the anti-smoking commercials aired during 1968-1971 and, consequently, 
the relevance of the advertising ban of 1971. Authors such as Warner and Hamilton find 
anti-smoking commercials to be a potent weapon in countering cigarette advertising. Hence, 
they conclude that the ban on both positive and negative cigarette advertising serves to tip the 
scales in favor of the cigarette industry. Other authors such as Baltagi and Levin do not find 
such a powerful negative impact of the anti-smoking conmiercials. At best their results 
mildly support the efiBcacy of anti-smoking commercials in curtailing cigarette consumption. 
Thus, they find no evidence that a ban on both pro and anti-smoking commercials raises 
consumption. The next section will focus on the micro-foundations of modeling cigarette 
demand. 
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A Brief Introduction to Competing Models of Cigarette Demand 
As is the case with many topics in economics, there are numerous studies on the 
demand for cigarettes and tobacco. The purpose of this section is to focus on that portion of 
the literature which addresses the theoretical micro foundations of modeling cigarette 
demand. In order to explore the plethora of studies that have been done on this aspect of 
cigarette consumption, it is useful to classify the literature. Figure 2.1 provides one such 
classification. 
Non-addictive Specifications of Cigarette Demand 
In the early 1970s some economists modeled the demand for cigarettes in the same 
way as the demand for non-addictive goods. For example, Hamilton (1972) and Warner 
(1977) estimate a demand function for cigarettes that depends primarily on income and 
cigarette prices. These early studies did not model cigarette demand as a function of either 
past or future consumption. Most of the studies on cigarette health information that were 
reviewed in the previous section would fall into this category. 
Ggarette Demand 
Mbn-aodictive nDdels Addictive Models 
Discrete Models ContinuoiE .Vbdels 
Figure 2.1: A Classification of Cigarette Demand Studies 
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Addictive Specifications of Cigarette Demand 
Other economists did try to account for the habit forming nature of cigarettes and 
attempted to model their demand as a function of prices, income and past consumption. 
Houthaker and Taylor (1966) were perhaps the first to model the demand for cigarettes as a 
function of income, prices and a stock of past consimiption. The distinguishing feature of the 
addictive models is that in addition to prices and income they model cigarette demand as a 
function of past consumption and/or prices and future consimiption and/or prices. 
Myopic Models of Addiction 
Addictive models in turn can be divided into two categories: myopic models and 
rational models. Grossman (1991) points out that both myopic and rational models stress the 
dependence of present consumption on past consumption. However, myopic models fail to 
account for the effects of current consumption on future utility. In other words, myopic 
models produce demand functions for current consumption that are independent of future 
prices and future consimiption levels. For example, Elster (1979), Schelling (1984), and 
Winston (1980) modeled the demand for addictive goods as dependent on past consumption. 
However, they did not consider the impact of current consumption on future choices. 
Rational Models of Addiction 
The rational school of addiction will be reviewed briefly here, because the next 
section is devoted to taking a detailed look at three versions of this model. The models of 
rational addiction can in turn be classified into their discrete and continuous counterparts. 
The terms discrete and continuous are used in keeping with the recreation demand literature. 
Freeman (1993). Discrete models refer to zero-one choice dependent variables whereas 
continuous models refer to dependent variables that can take on continuous values. Discrete 
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models of rational addiction strive to explain starting and quitting rates among smokers. For 
example, Douglas and Hariharan (1994) estimate the probability of starting to smoke based 
on a forward looking utility maximization model that incorporates the stock of past 
consumption. Douglas (1998) provides the most recent example of this type of work. He 
uses a rational addiction based expected utility model to estimate the duration of the smoking 
habit along with the probabilities of starting and quitting. 
On the other hand, continuous models of rational addiction seek to explain the 
relationship between the quantity of cigarettes smoked and the magnimde of past, present and 
future prices, income, advertising and the past stock of consumption. Although Becker and 
Murphy (1988) have become the main proponents of die continuous rational addiction 
model, earlier work by Spinnewyn (1981), lannaccone (1984) and Stigler and Becker (1977) 
laid the foundation for a rational analysis of addictive behavior. Spinnewyn claimed that it is 
possible to model highly addictive goods based on a stable preference structure if one treats 
the amounts of addictive consumption (i.e.,, consumption as a result of craving in each time 
period) as a cost imposed on the agent given his original preferences. Under this approach, 
the agent maximizes intertemporal utility in each period subject to resource and minimum 
consumption constraints. One such constraint is to consume at least a given amount of the 
addictive good because of the impact of previous consumption. 
Stigler and Becker incorporate Spinnewyn's ideas within a model of household 
production. The authors argue that agents do not consiune goods but that they consume 
commodities that are produced by the agents themselves using market goods and human 
capital. Their justification for using a rational model to explain addictive behavior is as 
follows: Agents' preferences for an addictive commodity (not the same as an addictive 
good) are stable because the effects of the addictive nature of the good are accounted for in 
the device of consumption capital. Stigler and Becker give the example of music 
appreciation. They say that the bundle of commodities that a household consumes can be 
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broken down into music appreciation and a vector of all other commodities. Music 
appreciation is in turn is produced by the time allocated to music and the human capital 
conducive to music appreciation. Subsequently, Stigler and Becker claim that human capital 
conducive to music appreciation is produced using inputs of educational attainment and 
previous amounts of music appreciation. It is through this household production approach 
diat Stigler and Becker are able to account for the impact of past and future consumption of 
the addictive good on current consimiption, without having to concede to a changing 
preference structure. 
The attractive aspect of rational addiction theory is that it allows economists to bring 
most of their standard utility and demand theory tools to bear with a few adjustments. In 
addition, the rational model demonstrates theoretical superiority over the myopic school 
because myopic behavior is a subclass of the rational model and can be modeled as agents 
having an infinite rate of time preference for the present. As is the case with most theoretical 
debates, the proponents of the respective theories look to the data for support. Studies by 
Chaloupka (1991) and Becker et al. (1994) show that rational addiction models yield demand 
functions that do fit the data quite well; and of late, it is this school of thought that has 
dominated the economic research on modeling addiction. 
Finally, it is appropriate to discuss the double hurdle model. The double hurdle 
model is an econometric technique that has been used to estimate the demand for cigarettes. 
Jones (1989) argues that in order to start smoking a potential smoker must clear two hurdles. 
First, the consmner must decide whether or not to smoke. Next, given that a consumer has 
decided to smoke, she must decide how much to smoke at the current prices and income 
level. Both these decisions can be modeled within either a myopic or a rational framework. 
Thus, the double hurdle model can be incorporated into either a myopic or a rational demand 
model. Having reviewed various competing microeconomic models of cigarette demand, it 
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is appropriate to take a closer look at the leading model that is used to analyze the demand 
for cigarettes. 
The Rational Addiction Model in Detail 
The next three sub-sections will review three of the more prominent versions of the 
rational addiction model. The most extensively cited of these is the purely theoretical work 
of Becker and Murphy. This work was operationalized and tested empirically using panel 
data by Chaloupka. He found support for the main predictions of the Becker-Murphy model. 
Further support was provided for the theoretical work of Becker and Murphy by the time-
series analysis of Becker et al. The Becker et al. time-series effort uses a discrete version of 
the rational addiction model developed by Becker and Murphy and can be shown to be a 
special case of Chaloupka's model. Since the theory that will be derived and implemented in 
this dissertation draws heavily upon the aforementioned works, it is important to review them 
in detail. 
The Becker-Murphy Rational Addiction Model 
Becker and Murphy state that even strong addictions are rational in that they are the 
result of forward-looking utility maximizing behavior with stable preferences. They claim to 
be the first to stress the importance of unstable steady-state consumption levels in explaining 
the addiction process. Their model shows that the long-run demand for addicts tends to be 
more elastic than the long-run demand for non-addicts. The Becker-Murphy model also 
explains phenomena such as binges and cold turkey within a utility maximizing fi-amework. 
Finally, their model explains the relationship of temporarily stressful lifetime events to 
permanent addictions. 
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Becker and Murphy assume that utility at any point in time depends on C(t), the 
amoimt of the addictive good that is consimaed; Y(t), the amount of the composite numeraire 
good; and S(t), the stock of consumption capital. 
Past consumption of C affects this period's utility through S, which is said to accrue by a 
process of learning by doing. Consequently, current consumption of C has two effects. The 
immediate effect of C on current utility and the impact of C on future utility via the accrual 
of S. The utility fimction u[-] is assumed to be strictly concave in all its arguments. Given a 
constant rate of time preference a and length of life T, the instantaneous utility function gives 
rise to the following lifetime utility fimction: 
The stock of consumption capital, S, or the addictive stock as it is also called accrues 
according to the following rule: 
The time rate of change of the addictive stock, S(t), is given by the difference between the 
rate at which the stock accrues through current consumption and the rate of exogenous and 
endogenous depreciation of the addictive stock. 5 reflects the rate of exogenous depreciation 
of the physical and mental effects of the drug. Becker and Murphy define D(t) as the 
expenditure by the agents to depreciate the addictive stock. However, in order to be 
consistent with their lifetime budget constraint, D(t) should be defined as the actual number 
U(t) = u[Y(t),C(t),S(t)] (2.1) 
(2.2) 
S(t) = C(t)-5S(t)-h[D(t)]. (2.3) 
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of units of endogenous depreciation. The last piece of the puzzle is the lifetime budget 
constraint. 
e"" [Y(t) + (t)C(t) + (t)D(t)]dt ^ AQ + e-^w(S(t))dt (2.4) 
The left hand side of equation (2.4) represents the present value of die continuously 
discounted sum of expenditures over the agent's lifetime. In each time period, these 
expenditures are comprised of the sum spent on the composite good, Y(t) (which is also the 
numeraire with a price set to unity); the amount spent on the addictive good (which is the 
product of its price P^(t) and the quantity consumed C(t)); and the amount spent on 
endogenous depreciation of the addictive stock (which is die product of its price Pj(t) 
multiplied by the quantity D(t)). The right hand side of the lifetime budget constraint 
represents the present value of the continuously discounted sum of earnings by the agent. A<, 
is the initial value of assets. The agent's earnings function at time t, w(S(t)), is assumed to be 
a concave fimction of the addictive stock. The market rate of interest is assumed to be r. 
Finally, in order to state a lifetime budget constraint, Becker and Murphy assume that capital 
markets are perfect, thus allowing an agent to borrow against future earnings. 
The rational addict maximizes her lifetime utility fimction given by equation (2.2) 
subject to the addictive stock constraint and the Ufetime budget constraint given by equations 
(2.3) and (2.4), respectively. The Becker-Murphy first order conditions of the above problem 
provide useful insights into various facets of addictive behavior. However, it should be 
noted that in order to obtain the precise form of their first order conditions, the additional 
assumption of cr = r is required. They do not make this assumption explicit until a later 
section in their paper. The first order conditions derived from equations (2.1) through (2.4) 
are the following: 
Uy(t) = (2.5) 
hd(t)a( t )  =  ^ Pd(t)e(^- ' )^  (2.6) 
Uc(t) = ^Pc(t)e(^ - -a(t) ^ nc(t) (2.7) 
where a(t) is defined as follows: 
rT^-(c + 5)(x-t)^ (2.8) 
Note that p. represents the Lagrange multiplier which can be interpreted as the 
marginal utiUty of wealth in this problem. Equation (2.6) states that the marginal utility of 
consmnption from the composite good at any point in time, y(t), equals the marginal utility 
of wealth. If a = r, as is presupposed for the derivation of equations (2.6) and (2.7), then the 
exponential term in equation (2.5) reduces to unity. Equations (2.6) and (2.7) both contain 
the term a(t) which is defined by equation (2.8). The term a(t) is used to symbolize what 
Becker and Murphy refer to as the shadow price of an additional unit of the addictive stock. 
It represents the costs of discounted future utihty and wages as the result of increasing the 
addictive stock S by a single unit at the margin. The impact of an additional unit of stock on 
utiUty and wages is negative by assumption, i.e., U3< 0 and < 0. 
Becker and Murphy say that equation (2.6) implies that the expenditure on 
endogenous depreciation D will rise as the shadow price a(t) declines. Finally equation (2.7) 
brings us to the tradeoffs faced by a rational addict in determining the optimal amount of 
consumption of the addictive good. The term nc(t) in equation (2.7) is called the full price 
of the addictive good. This is because it consists of the time discounted money price of the 
good and the time discounted price the agent pays in terms of lowered future utihty and 
wages as a result of consuming the good. The marginal impact of S on utility and wages is 
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negative by assiimption. Thus, an agent determines the optimal level of C by equating the 
marginal utility of C to n^- (t), the full price of consumption. In other words, a rational agent 
determines the optimal amount of consumption of the addictive good by weighing the current 
marginal utility of the good against the money price of the good and the costs imposed upon 
future utility and wages. 
For the next part of their article, Becker and Murphy further assume that D(t) = 0 and 
a = r. Equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) can be manipulated to yield a second order linear 
differential equation in S(t), which is the Euler equation for the system. The solution of this 
Euler equation jdelds the following optimal time path for S(t) 
S(t) = (SQ-S*)e^l^+s'' (2.9) 
where So is the initial value of the addictive stock, S' is the steady-state value of the addictive 
stock and A., is the smaller root of the Euler equation for S(t). Plugging the solution for S(t) 
from equation (2.9) into the addictive stock constraint given by equation (2.3) with D(t) = 0 
yields the following optimal time path for C(t), the consumption of the addictive good 
C(t)  =  (5 + >. i )S( t ) ->. iS*.  (2 .10)  
Becker and Murphy, then use equations (2.9) and (2.10) to illustrate how their model 
explains the process of getting hooked and other addiction phenomena such as binges and 
cold turkey. Their definition of addiction is merely a situation where the current 
consumption of the addictive good leads to an increase in the future consumption of that 
good. Analytically speaking, this corresponds to an increase in consumption due to an 
increase in the addictive stock of the good. Thus, equation (2.10) provides the following 
condition for addiction: 
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^^>0 as (5 + X,)>0.  (2.11)  
dS(t)  ^ V 
Their analysis of the time path of S(t) indicates that if an agent accrues more than a critical 
level of the addictive stock, then that agent gets hooked to the addictive good. If the agent is 
at a level below the critical stock, then ceteris paribus over time the agent will reduce 
consumption of the addictive good until abstinence is the final outcome. Thus, agents that 
experience a temporarily stressful event that raises their additive stock above the critical level 
will develop a permanent addiction. Their analysis of the time path of S(t) also shows that 
for sufficiently strong addictions the time path of S(t) becomes discontinuous at some level 
of stock, going to zero below Thus, for agents that are strongly addicted, the 
rational addiction model predicts that if their level of addictive stock falls below they 
will find it optimal to go cold turkey in order to quit their habit. 
The common belief about addictive goods is that their demand is insensitive to price 
because of the habit fonning nature of the good. However, the Becker-Murphy first order 
conditions show an explicit role for price in the amount of the addictive good consumed. In 
fact their model suggests that since current consumption may impact future consumption 
through the addictive stock, a drop in current price may have larger effects for the long-run 
demand of an addictive good than a non-addictive good, because the price cut not only 
increases current consumption but also impacts upon future consimiption through the 
addictive stock. Thus, the work of Becker and Murphy provides testable implications 
regarding the behavior of addicts. Chaloupka (1991) was among the first to operationalize 
their theory and derive tractable demand equations for the addictive good. Becker et al. 
(1994) also develop an empirical model to test the Becker-Murphy theory of rational 
addiction. This latter model turns out to be a sub-class of Chaloupka's model. A detailed 
25 
review of the models which yield these tractable demand functions for addictive goods 
follows. 
Chaloupka's Model of Rational Addiction 
This sub-section will attempt to provide a detailed look at a simplified version of the 
Becker-Murphy model as proposed by Frank Chaloupka. The purpose of this sub-section is 
to fully understand the derivation of the dynamic demand equations using a quadratic utility 
function. This approach accounts for the addictive nature of the good by appealing to 
Becker's household production theory, as well as by incorporating features of addictive 
goods such as tolerance, reinforcement and withdrawal in the specification of the utility 
flmction. 
In the tradition of Becker and Murphy, Chaloupka models utility as a function of 
health H(t), relaxation due to addictive consumption R(t) and a composite of other 
commodities Z(t). 
Health H(t), in turn, is produced by a vector of market goods M(t) and the addictive stock of 
the good A(t). 
Increases in the addictive stock impact health adversely at an increasing rate (H^ < 0 and 
Haa ^ 0)- On the other hand, an increase in the quantity of market inputs is beneficial for 
health but at a decreasing rate (H^ > 0 and H^m < 0)- These relationships are graphed in 
Figtires 2.2 and 2.3. Relaxation R(t) is produced as a flmction of the amount of cigarettes 
consumed at a point in time C(t) and the addictive stock A(t). 
U(t) = u[H(t),R(t),Z(t)] (2.12) 
H(t) = H[M(t), A(t)] (2.13) 
26 
R(t) = R[C(t), A(t)] (2.14) 
Increases in cigarette consumption increase relaxation but at a diminishing rate (R<- > 0, R<-c < 
0). In order to incorporate the concept of tolerance, it is assumed that increases in the 
addictive stock decrease relaxation at an increasing rate < 0, < 0). These 
relationships are graphed in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Finally, in order to incorporate 
reinforcement, it is assumed that for any given level of consumption an increase in the 
addictive stock will lead to a higher level of relaxation (R^a > 0). Figure 2.6 shows that at 
greater levels of A, R^ is larger. This is what is conveyed by R^^ ^ 0- Thus CD is steeper 
than AB. However, since R^ < 0, CD must he below AB. The composite good Z(t) is 
produced using X(t), a vector of market goods, and the individual's own time. 
Here again we make the standard assumption of positive but diminishing marginal 
productivity (Zx > 0, Zxx < 0). 
Given the above household production mechanism, Chaloupka obtains the derived 
instantaneous utility function by substituting for H(t), R(t) and Z(t) from equations (2.13)-
(2.15) into equation (2.12), yielding 
Z(t) = Z[X(t)] (2.15) 
U(t) = u[R[C(t), A(t)], H[ M(t), A(t)], Z[X(t)]] (2.16) 
or, in reduced form. 
U(t) = U[C(t), A(t), Y(t)] (2.17) 
where Y(t) is a vector of goods used in the production of health and the composite good Z(t), 
(i.e., Y(t) = [M(t), X(t)]). Since the substitution of R[ ], H[ ] and Z[ ] into (2.16) may result 
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Figure 2.6: Reinforcement, Consumption and the Addictive Stock 
in a change in the exact form taken by the function u, it is appropriate to designate the new 
reduced form ftmction as U[ ]. 
Chaloupka uses equation (2.16) to demonstrate how the model incorporates concepts 
such as tolerance, reinforcement and withdrawal. Tolerance refers to the phenomenon of 
achieving a lower level of response from a given amount of the addictive substance. Thus, as 
the level of cumulative past consumption rises, an agent would receive a lower level of 
satisfaction from each additional unit of the substance. The model incorporates this feature 
as is evidenced by the sign of the partial derivative of equation (2.16) with respect to A. 
Withdrawal, on the other hand, refers to adverse physical effects that result from a reduction 
in consumption of the addictive substance. In other words, withdrawal is evidenced by a 
reduction in utility due to a reduction or termination of consumption. This is demonstrated 
UA = URRa+ UHHA < 0 
(+) (-) (+) (-) 
(2.18) 
by 
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Uc=URRC>0.  (2.19)  
(-^) (+) 
Finally, reinforcement refers to the increasing benefits from each additional unit of the 
substance as the agent's past experience with the drug increases. One might think of 
reinforcement as the body's ability to relax more with the incremental unit of consumption as 
a result of a learned response based on past consumption. Reinforcement says that for any 
given level of consimiption, the larger the addictive stock, the larger the increase in 
relaxation and, hence, in utility. 
UcA ~ ('^RR K-A) ^c"*" (^CA^ ^ (2.20) 
(-) (-) (-) (-) (*) 
Equation (2.17) gives rise to the following lifetime utility function 
U = ^e""u[C(t),A(t),Y(t)]dt. (2.21) 
The lifetime utility function is just a continuous sum of the discounted instantaneous utility 
functions (2.17) at each point in time where a represents the agent's personal rate of time 
preference. 
Just as in any other consumer problem, the agent is subject to a budget constraint. In 
his model, Chaloupka assumes that capital markets are perfect, so that the total amount of 
income available to the agent at any point in time is R(0), the present discounted value of 
lifetime earnings and assets. Chaloupka also assumes that Y(t) is the numeraire good (That 
is, the price of Y(t), (t), is unity with all other prices being measured relative to (t)). 
Chaloupka obtains the following lifetime budget constraint 
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J^e-'^[Y(t) + P^(t)C(t)]dt<R(0) (2.22) 
where r represents the market rate of interest. P^Ct) is the monetary price of cigarettes at time 
t. The lifetime budget constraint says that at any point in time expenditures on goods must be 
such that the sum of those expenditures over the agent's lifetime carmot exceed the present 
value of lifetime earnings and assets. 
The agent's maximization problem is subject to another constraint which Chaloupka 
calls the "Investment Function." This constraint must be satisfied at each point in time. It is 
a differential equation which gives the relationship between the consumption of cigarettes 
and the addictive stock of the good. 
where A(t) is the addictive stock of cigarettes at time t, C(t) is the consimiption of cigarettes 
at time t, 5 is the depreciation rate of the addictive stock, A(0) is the initial addictive stock 
and A(t) is the time rate of change of the addictive stock. 
C(t) influences future consimiption levels through its impact on die time rate of 
change of the addictive stock of cigarettes. The constraint implies that the rate of change of 
the addictive stock of cigarettes at an instant in time is equal to the current amount of 
cigarette consimiption less a depreciation factor 5A(t). A more intuitive understanding of the 
addictive stock concept is possible by examining the general solution to equation (2.23). 
This differential equation has a time dependent coefficient and time dependent term. 
It may be solved using the integrating factor approach. The solution is as follows: 
A(t)=—5^ = C(t)-5A(t) 
at 
(2.23) 
A(0) = Ao (2.24) 
31 
A(t) = e"^^[A(0) + |C( v)e^^dv]. (2.25) 
0 
The details of the solution are contained in Appendix A. Equation (2.25) implies that at any 
point in time t, the addictive stock A(t) of an agent is equal to the depreciation discounted 
value of the initial addictive stock A(0) and a cumulative sum from time zero until the 
present of depreciation discounted cigarette consumption at each point in time. If the initial 
addictive stock is zero, then the current addictive stock reduces to a discounted sum of past 
cigarette consumption. 
At this point it may be useful to elucidate how Chaloupka's rational addiction model 
explains the consumption of an addictive good within the context of a stable preference 
structure. In keeping with Becker and Murphy, Chaloupka's model postulates that the 
addictive good is used in combination with other goods and the agent's time to produce a 
commodity, relaxation, which the agent then proceeds to consume. The key issue here is that 
the agent's preferences for relaxation in relation to other commodities remain unchanged 
over a period of time. It is possible for the agent to become highly addicted to the good 
being used to produce relaxation (e.g. cigarettes). However, within the context of the 
household production framework, an increase in the addictive stock just means that the agent 
needs to consume more cigarettes in order to achieve a given level of relaxation. It does not 
mean that the agent's preferences for relaxation have changed. It is this reasoning which 
allows the rational addiction models to maintain a stable preference structure. 
The agent's lifetime utility maximization problem may be stated as follows: 
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C(t),Y(t) JO 
Max r e-^U[C(t),A(t),Y(t)]dt 
subject to 
_^e-'^[Y(t) + P^(t)C(t)]dt<R(0) 
A(t) = C(t)-5A(t) 
A(0) = Ao- (2.26) 
The first order conditions are: 
UY(t)  =  ne ' ' ' " ' ' '  (2.27) 
Uc(t) = ^e''^-^"P,(t)-e'^X(t) (2.28) 
According to equation (2.27), the marginal utility of the numeraire at any point in time t is 
equal to the shadow value of the lifetime budget constraint discounted continuously at the 
rate given by the difference between the personal rate of time preference and the market rate 
of interest. Equation (2.28) suggests that a first order condition for utility maximization is 
that the agent equates the marginal utility of consumption of cigarettes at time t to the 
difference between the marginal utility of the numeraire Y multiplied by the current price of 
cigarettes Pc(t) and the continuously discounted shadow value of the addictive stock X.(t). 
The shadow value of the addictive stock X,(t) is the change in total utility that results from 
changing the level of the addictive stock by a single unit. However, since there is no market 
for addictive stock, the agent must discount the impact of the additional stock at the personal 
rate of time preference a. 
Chaloupka's model differs from the Becker-Murphy framework in several respects. 
Chaloupka does not explicitly consider the impact of the addictive stock on the agent's wage 
rate. He just assumes that the present value of the agent's lifetime earnings and assets is 
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given by R(0). Unlike Becker and Murphy, Chaloupka does not explicitly consider the role 
of endogenous depreciation of consumption capital. He assumes no endogenous depreciation 
of the addictive stock in his model. Finally, Chaloupka's work differs from the Becker-
Murphy model in that it is an applied piece. He derives specific demand flmctions for the 
addictive goods given by equations (2.30) and (2.31), unlike Becker and Murphy who only 
characterize addictive behavior by the time paths of consumption and the addictive stock 
given by equations (2.9) and (2.10). 
Deriving Specific Demand Functions 
Having set up the general framework for an addictive consumer, Chaloupka proceeds 
by assuming that the instantaneous utility function as represented by equation (2.17) takes 
the form of a quadratic fimction in C(t), Y(t) and A(t). In order to simplify the analysis, the 
additional assimiption is made that the consumer's rate of time preference equals the market 
rate of interest (i.e., CT = r). He has the following instantaneous quadratic utility function 
U(t) = bYY(t) + bc(t) C(t) + b.:,A(t) + 1/2 UY,.Y(t)- + 1/2 UccC(t)-
+ 1/2 U^A(t)- + Uy.,Y(t)A(t) + Uc.,C(t)A(t) + UycY(t)C(t). (2.29) 
Maximizing equation (2.29) with respect to Y(t), converting to discrete time in the interest 
of obtaining analytically tractable demand functions and using the first order conditions that 
result from problem (2.26), Chaloupka obtains the following demand equations: 
C(t) = PQ + PiP^(t) + ^3^0^^ 
C(t) = (j)^ + (j)^P^(t) + +1) + <j,3C(t +1) + . (2.31) 
Equations (2.30) and (2.31) are the dynamic demand equations for the addictive good based 
on a model of rational addiction. Equation (2.30) states that the current level of cigarette 
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demand in period t depends upon the prices of cigarettes in periods t, (t-1) and (t+1). It also 
depends upon consumption in period (t-1) and on the next period's consumption. Equation 
(2.31) models current cigarette demand as being dependent on this period's price, next 
period's price and consumption and the level of this period's addictive stock. The 
appearance of some of these explanatory variables deserves further explanation. The above 
demand equations have been derived based on the underlying theory of rational addiction. 
Simply stated, the theory says that consumers are aware of the future costs of current actions 
and take these into account while making current consimiption decisions. For example, the 
longer a person smokes, the more intense and prolonged the withdrawal symptoms. This is 
modeled by including the current addictive stock in equation (2.31). Another future cost that 
the rational consumer considers is the future price of cigarettes. Thus, P(t+1) is present in 
equation (2.30). Since addiction by its very nature causes the level of current consumption to 
be influenced by past consumption and since past consumption in turn is influenced by past 
prices, P(t-l) is included in equation (2.30). Chaloupka, Becker and Murphy characterize 
rational models as models in which agents are aware of and account for the interdependence 
of past, current and future consumption decisions. Furthermore, in a rational addiction 
model agents are assumed to keep these interdependent relationships in mind while making 
current constmiption decisions. Hence, current, past and future prices and the addictive stock 
appear in the above demand equations. 
Myopic demand equations are a subclass of the above demand equations. They can 
be obtained by assuming an infinite rate of time preference because myopic agents place all 
the weight on the current period's utility and discount the utility of all future periods at an 
infinite rate such that their present value is zero. As is to be expected of short-sighted 
agents, future prices do not enter into their demand equations. This is an important 
distinction between the two models, because it directly impacts upon the form of demand 
equation to be estimated. If the world were indeed myopic, then estimating rational demand 
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equations would merely yield estimates of the coefficients of future price that are not 
significantly different firom zero. Thus, not much is lost by using the rational model as a 
basic paradigm of addictive behavior because it does indeed encompass the realm of myopic 
behavior. 
Chaloupka uses equations (2.30) and (2.31) to derive long-run elasticities for the 
respective demand functions when consumption is at its steady state value C. The steady 
state version of equations (2.30) is: 
C* = (3„ + p,P,(t) + p.P,(t -1) + P3P,(t +1) + + PjC* (2.32) 
Upon simplification we get: 
p„ + ^P,(t) + |3A(i-l) + |3,P,(t-H) 
l -Pi-Ps 
(2.33) 
Thus, the long-nm own price elasticity for equation (2.33) is given by: 
OC' P [(Pi^P,+P3)/(l-P4-P5)]P (2.34) 
oP C C* 
The steady state version of equation (2.31) is: 
C C -({)o +(t)iP(.(t) + (t)2Pc(t + l)+<t>3C +(t)4 —. 
O 
(2.35) 
Upon simplification this yields: 
o 
(2.36) 
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Thus, the long-run own price elasticity for equation (2.36) is given by: 
dC' P [(i|)i+(|);)/{1-({>3-((|),/5)}]P 
a? c c' (2.37) 
Empirical Framework and Results 
It is useful to review the empirical results of Chaloupka's study which support the 
Becker-Murphy model. Cigarene consumption data from 1976-1980, obtained from the 
Second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey on 28,000 people aged six 
months to 74 years were used. In order to estimate equation (2.30), three consecutive periods 
of consumption data are required. However, only two were available for Chaloupka. 
Therefore, Chaloupka addresses this problem by treating past consumption as current 
consumption and by treating current consumption as future consumption. He then simulates 
past consumption as being either zero for non-smokers or equal to the maximum 
consimiption for smokers and former smokers. 
Chaloupka estimates the addictive stock for non-smokers by the following 
expression; 
In order to estimate equations (2.30) and (2.31), Chaloupka collected data on current 
consumption, current price, future price and lagged consumption by county of residence. 
Due to the endogeneity of current consumption with past and future consumption in equation 
(2.30) or with the addictive stock and future consumption in equation (2.31), Chaloupka uses 
an instrumental variable technique for estimating these equations. The instruments used to 
measure lagged and lead consumption were ail past, current and future real cigarette prices. 
(2.38) 
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Similarly, the instrumental variables used to measure the addictive stock and future 
consumption were current, lagged and lead real cigarette prices and current, lagged and lead 
excise taxes. Other variables that were included in the regressions were age, age squared, 
sex, race, family income, educational attainment, a set of excise taxes and marital and labor 
force status. Chaloupka was aware of the county of residence of each consumer. In an 
attempt to control for border crossover bias, Chaloupka uses an equally weighted average of 
the border price and the local price of cigarettes. Border crossover refers to the practice of 
individuals from a high tax area crossing the county or state border to purchase cigarettes in a 
lower tax area. The border price is defined as the lowest price within twenty five miles of the 
county of residence. 
The estimated long-run price elasticity of demand for the full sample varies between 
-0.36 and -0.27. Chaloupka maintains that these are substantially higher estimates than those 
obtained from non-addictive cigarette consumption models. As per the predictions of the 
rational model, the estimates show that past and future consumption do indeed have 
significant and positive effects on current consumption. Furthermore, past and futiu-e prices 
have a positive effect on current consumption. 
In order to examine the impact of time preference on demand, Chaloupka estimates 
demand equations separately for groups differing in age and educational attainment. The 
results show that less educated agents tend to behave more myopically than others. Present 
oriented individuals are expected to be more responsive to the market price of the addictive 
good than future oriented agents because, for myopic agents, the impact of current 
consumption on future utility is heavily discounted. The results of Chaloupka's smdy 
support the predictions of the Becker-Murphy model of rational addiction. 
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Becker-Grossman-Murphy Tests of the Rational Addiction Model 
Becker et al. provide further empirical support for the Becker-Miuphy theory of 
rational addiction. They are the first to derive rational addiction demand equations for 
cigarettes using a completely discrete approach. Both Becker and Murphy and Chaloupka 
have appealed to continuous models at some point or other. Becker et al. use annual data that 
is disaggregated by state for the U.S. for the period 1955-1985. They operationalize the 
theory of Becker and Murphy by developing an empirically testable demand equation. Next, 
they use this equation to identify and test some of the theoretical implications of ±e Becker-
.Murphy model. 
Becker et al. propose the following discrete instantaneous utility flmction: 
where Uj is the utility at time L, is the amount of the composite or numeraire good at time 
t, C, is the amount of the addictive good consiuned at time t, C,., is the previous period's 
consimiption of the addictive good and et measures other period t unobservable life-cycle 
variables that impact utility. Note that the addictive stock A, is represented by C,.,. This will 
be discussed in greater detail when the addictive stock constraint is reviewed. Becker et al. 
assume that individuals live forever and that they maximize the sum of their lifetime utility 
discounted at the market rate of interest r. This gives rise to the following lifetime utility 
flmction: 
=U(Yj,C^,C t '^ t '^ t - r®t^ (2.39) 
OQ 
(2.40) 
t=i 
where B = (1 + r) 
The lifetime budget constraint is given by; 
Xr'CY t-P.C )=A,  (2.41) 
where A<j is the present value of lifetime wealth. Finally, the discrete version of the addictive 
stock constraint is given by: 
A,  =C,_,+(1-5)A,_, .  (2.42)  
Equation (2.42) suggests that this period's addictive stock is equal to last period's 
consumption plus the undepreciated portion (1-5) of last period's addictive stock. Becker et 
al. assume a depreciation rate of one-hundred percent, i.e., 5 = 1. Thus, A, = C,.,. Hence, A, 
does not appear in the utility function given by equation (2.40). 
The consumer maximizes lifetime utility given by equation (2.40) subject to an initial 
value of consumption C° and the lifetime budget and addictive stock constraints given by 
equations (2.41) and (2.42) respectively. The resulting first order conditions are: 
UY(Y^,Cj ,C^_^,e^)  =  X (2.43)  
= (2.44) 
Equation (2.43) implies that the marginal utility of income equals the marginal utility of 
wealth. Equation (2.44) implies that the present value of the marginal utility of current 
consumption equals the product of current price times the marginal utility of wealth. Next, 
Becker et al. assume that the utility function takes the quadratic form given by equation 
(2.29). They solve equations (2.43) and (2.44) to get the following demand equation: 
Cj  = eCj  _  1+|30Cj I  +  ^  ^ .  (2.45) 
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Becker et al. use the above equation to operationalize and test some of the predictions 
of the Becker-Murphy rational addiction model. Specifically, they claim that the addictive 
nature of a good can be determined by looking at the sign of 9. If past consumption increases 
current consumption, 9 will be positive in sign. In other words, the presence of an addictive 
good is supported by a positive 9. Another test of the rational addiction model is whether 
cigarette consumption is responsive to price. This can be determined by examining the 
coefficient of current price in equation (2.45). The rational addiction model predicts that the 
long-run elasticities of demand must exceed the short-run elasticities. The long-run 
elasticities can be computed for equation (2.45) in the same manner as in equations (2.34) 
and (2.37). Finally, note that equation (2.45) allows the researcher to test whether consumers 
are myopic or rational in their behavior. Myopic agents discount the future heavily. Thus, if 
myopia were present, one would expect to see a value of P close to zero. In other words, the 
coefBcient of future consumption would not be significant in equation (2.45). This would 
give rise to an equation of the form: 
On the other hand, the hypothesis of rationality would be supported by the presence of a 
positively significant coefficient on future consumption. 
Becker et al. use statewide time-series data for the U.S. fi^om 1955-1985. They 
incorporate the impact of health scares by using yearly dummy variables and use tax 
differentials among states to capture the effect of inter-state cigarette smuggling. They use 
instrumental variable methods to estimate equation (2.45) because the coefficients from 
ordinary least squares would be biased due to the endogeneity of C,., and C,.,. They find diat 
the estimated effects of past and future consumption on current consumption are significant 
and positive while the estimated current period price effects are negative. The authors also 
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estimate equation (2.46). They find that cigarette smoking is negatively related to current 
price and positively related to past consumption. When a one period lead price is added and 
equation (2.46) is estimated by two stage least squares, the coefBcient on the lead price turns 
out to be negative and significant. This shows that the data do not support a myopic model 
because variables from the future do play a role in current consumption decisions. 
The empirical evidence according to Chaloupka and Becker et al. provides strong 
support for the rational addiction model. In addition, the rational model can generate myopic 
behavior as a sub case. Thus, any study dealing with an economic analysis of addictive 
goods should consider the contribution of the rational addiction model. The rational 
addiction model in its current form does not concentrate on generating non-addictive goods 
as a special case because that was never the purpose of this model. The next chapter extends 
the rational addiction model proposed by Becker et al. to provide a microeconomic basis for 
the sub case of non-addictive goods. It also considers die impact of addiction information on 
cigarette demand. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY 
A Generalized Cigarette Demand Model with Addiction Information 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a model in which a single utility 
maximization problem can yield the demand for either an addictive good or a non-addictive 
good. Furthermore, this model will strive to predict changes in the behavior of consumers 
who are consuming addictive goods (without the explicit knowledge of the future 
consequences of current consumption) when they are informed of the addictive aspects of the 
good that they are consuming. 
It is important to be able to test the hypothesis whether cigarettes are an addictive 
good because this has been matter of debate between the cigarette industry and the 
government. In addition to this, the impact of addiction information on consumption patterns 
of an addictive good warrants an investigation because of the policy implications of the 
potential sensitivity of consumption of such goods to this information. This chapter will begin 
with a general microeconomic model that establishes a single framework for the derivation of 
the demand for a good regardless of its addictive properties. Then, the sub cases of myopic 
and rational addictive demand will be explored to examine the impact of addiction information 
on consumers. Next, a summary of the testable implications produced by this model is 
presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a solution to the difference equation generated 
by the theoretical model. 
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Generalizing the Rational Addiction Model: A Modified Stock Constraint 
In recent studies sucii as Becker et ai. (1994), the impact of an addictive good Ct on 
the agent's decision making process has been modeled by including a variable Ai, the addictive 
stock, as an argument of the utility function. Recall equation (2.17) in discrete form. 
The addictive stock in a given period is equal to the sum of last period's consumption 
and the undepreciated portion of last period's addictive stock. This is evident from equation 
(2.42) which is reproduced here for convenience. 
It should be noted that in equation (3.2), even if 5, the depreciation rate of the 
addictive stock, is one-hundred percent, the addictive stock in any time period is still equal to 
last period's consumption level. In other words for 5=1, equation (3.2) reduces to: 
Note that Yt, the non-addictive good, does not accrue an addictive stock. 
The 1988 Surgeon General's Report points out that nicotine produces pleasurable 
sensations by accumulating in the brain soon after inhalation. The prolonged use of nicotine 
over time causes the body to be accustomed to a certain level of the drug. If the body 
experiences a drop in the level of nicotine below the level that it is used to, then the person 
experiences withdrawal. If nicotine did not accumulate in the brain and produce its 
pleasurable effects and cause subsequent bio-chemical dependence, one might argue that 
Uj=U(Yt,Ct ,At)  (3.1) 
At  = Ct_,  +  (1 -  5)At_i  (3.2) 
At  -  Ct_i .  (3.3) 
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nicotine is not addictive. In an economic model of addiction, the parallel would be a good 
that did not accumulate an addictive stock. 
Consider, the following addictive stock equation; 
At=(l-cJ)Ct_i+(l-(^At_i. (3.4) 
Equation (3.4) states that At, the addictive stock at any point in time, is equal to (l-5)Ct.u the 
undepreciated portion of last period's consumption, plus (l-5)A<-i, the undepreciated portion 
of last period's addictive stock. The coeflBcient 5 is the rate at which last period's 
consumption and the addictive stock decay. If the depreciation effects of the drug are 
complete and instantaneous (i.e., if 5=1), then the addictive stock in period t will be zero even 
if the person consumed the substance in the last period. A non-addictive good is one that 
does not accumulate an addictive stock. Thus, one could model a non-addictive good as a 
special case of an addictive good with complete and instantaneous depreciation. This idea 
seems to be consistent with the medical facts of addiaion. If nicotine is instantly removed 
from the body, it will not have the time to accumulate in the brain and produce pleasurable 
effects or the longer term effects of bio-chemical dependence. 
Equation (3.4) is a first-order linear difference equation in At. Its solution is given by; 
A. =EO-5rC,+(l-5)'A,. (3.5) 
1=0 
Equation (3.5) implies that the addiaive stock at any point in time t is the sum of the 
undepreciated remnants of previous consumption plus the remaining undepreciated amount of 
the initial value of the addictive stock, Ao, that the person possesses at time zero. The details 
of the solution are contained in Appendix B. Given the assumption that the initial value of the 
addictive stock is zero, equation (3.5) reduces to; 
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t-1 
(3.6) 
i=0 
From equation (3.6) it is evident that for a depreciation rate less than one-hundred 
percent, past consumption contributes to the addictive stock. However, for the case of 
complete and instantaneous depreciation, the addictive stock is zero, giving rise to a good 
whose demand is independent of any habitual aspects. In other words, if a good is non-
addictive, it has a depreciation rate of 5=1. If on the other hand, the good is addictive, this 
would correspond to a depreciation rate of 5<1. Thus, a simple modification of the addictive 
stock constraint allows one to model the demand for both addictive and non-addictive goods 
as sub cases of a more general model. 
The agent's utility function at any point in time is dependent on Ct, the agent's 
consumption of the addictive good; Yt, the amount of the composite good; At, the stock of 
the addictive good; and et, other unobservable period t events that impact utility. The agent's 
period t utility function is represented by equation (3.7). 
By assumption, Uy^ >0, Uc^ >0 and <0. Marginal utility is assumed to increase 
with the consumption of the composite good and the consumption of the addictive good, 
while it is assumed to decrease with increases in the addictive stock. Thus, the model 
accounts for the presence of tolerance (U^^ <0) and withdrawal (U^^ >0). Tolerance 
refers to the effect of achieving a lower level of response from a given amount of the addictive 
The Rational Agent's Utility Maximization Problem 
Ut = U(Yj,C^,At,e^) (3.7) 
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substance as the level of past consumption rises. Withdrawal refers to the decline in utility 
from the reduction or cessation of consumption of the addictive good. Reinforcement refers 
to the increasing benefits from each additional unit of drug consumption as the agent's past 
experience with the substance increases. This is captured by assuming that ® The 
utility function is also assumed to be strictly concave in Yt, Ct and At. 
Next, assume a simplified version of the addictive stock constraint. In keeping with 
Becker et al., assume that only the previous period's consumption enters into the addictive 
stock. Thus, the simplified stock constraint is given by: 
Given that the agent lives for T years and discounts future utility at r, the rate of market 
interest, one can write the agent's lifetime utility function as; 
A, =(1-5)Q_,. (3.8) 
Substituting out for A< and using equation (3.8) in equation (3.7) yields: 
= U(Y^,C^,(l-5)Q_i,et). (3.9) 
T 
U(0) = X>^''^U(Yt,Ct,(l-^5)Ct_i,et) (3.10) 
t=l 
where 3 = . 3 is the agent's discount fector. (1 + r) 
The lifetime budget constraint is given by: 
T 
2r'(Y +p,c )=w.. (3.11) 
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Wo is tlie present value of lifetime wealth, and the price of Y, is one since Yt is the numeraire. 
Pt is the price of the addictive good in period t. Equation (3.11) is based upon the assumption 
of the existence of perfect capital markets. 
The consumer maximizes lifetime utility given by equation (3.10) subject to an initial 
value of consumption C° and the lifetime budget constraint given by equation (3.11). The 
Lagrangian for this problem can be written as; 
L = XP'"'U(Y(,Cj,(I-5)Cj_,,ej) + MW.-2P'"'(Y, (3.12) 
t = I  t = l  
The resulting first order conditions with respect to Yt and Ct are: 
Uv.(Y^,C^,(l-6)Cj_j,ep = X (3.13) 
Ui(Yt,Ct,(l-J)Ct_i,e^) + /?(l-c^U2(Yt^l,Ct + i,(l-(^Ct,et + l) = /lPt. 
(3.14) 
The first order conditions can be interpreted as follows. Equation (3.13) states that the 
marginal utility fi"om consuming the composite good is equal to the shadow price k, which 
itself is the marginal utility of wealth, k is assumed to be constant. Thus, the demand 
equation derived fi-om the first order conditions (3.13) and (3.14) holds the marginal utility of 
wealth constant. Equation (3.14) states that the present value of the marginal utility of 
current consumption equals the product of current price multiplied by the marginal utility of 
wealth. The rational addict not only considers the impact of current consumption on this 
period's marginal utility but also its impact on next period's utility through its contribution 
towards next period's addictive stock. It is interesting to note that when there is no 
depreciation in the model (i.e., 5=0), the resulting first order conditions are identical to those 
of Becker et al. given by equations (2.43) and (2.44). Furthermore, when 5=1, the first order 
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conditions given by equations (3.13) and (3.14), respectively, are independent of Ct-i, the past 
value of consumption. Thus, for the case of 5=1, equations (3.13) and (3.14) yield the first 
order conditions fi-om the dynamic utility maximization problem of a non-addictive good. 
Hence, one can model the demand for both addictive and non-addictive goods as sub cases of 
the same time consistent utility maximization problem. This approach eliminates the need for 
specifying different utility ftmctions for the same agent in order to model her consumption of 
both types of goods. In the next section a specific demand function is derived using a 
quadratic utility function. 
Deriving a Generalized Rational Addiction Demand Equation 
The utility function is assumed to be quadratic in Ct, this period's consumption; A,, the 
addictive stock; Yt, the composite good; and et, the unobservable life-cycle events. This 
function is given by equation (3.15). 
U, = U,C, + U,A, + Uy Y, + U.e, + ^  V,' + 
+Ui2CtAt + UiyCtYt + UieCtCt + U2yAtYt + U2eA.tet + UygYtet 
(3.15) 
Next, substitute out for At using equation (3.8). This yields the following 
instantaneous quadratic utility function; 
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= UA +U2(l-^Ct_i +UyYt +Ueet 
+^e?+Ui2Ct(l-^Ct_i + UiyCtYt +UieCtet 
+U2y (1 - (5)Ct _ I Yt + U2e (1 - S)C^ _ let + Uye YtCt. (3.16) 
One can use the specific utility function given by equation (3.16) to determine the exact form 
that the first order conditions given by equations (3.13) and (3.14) will take. The first order 
conditions that correspond to the quadratic utility fiinction specified in equation (3 .16) are: 
Uy +UyyYt+UlyCt+U2y(l-<^Ct_l+Uyeet =A (3.17) 
[Ui +UiiCt +Ui2(l- '^C^_ { +UiyYt +Uieet] 
+P[U,(1 - 6) + U„ (1 - 5)-C, + U,,(l - 5)C^ ^ J + (1 - 5)Y,^, 
+U,,(l-5)e,^,]=>J>,. (3.18) 
In keeping with Becker et al., solve equation (3.17) fisr Yt. The expression for Yt is given by 
equation (3.19). 
V - - Uy - U|yC| - Ulyd -5)Ct _ , - Uy,e.l 
t y ( ) 
yy 
Next, using equation (3.19), substitute out for Yi and Yt^^i in equation (3.18). Then solve for 
Ct. The resulting expression for Ct is given by equation (3.20). 
C, = tto +a,C^_, +aX,^^ (3-20) 
The a coeflBcients in equation (3.20) are defined as follows: 
50 
a„ = 
-U, - U, 
a-UJ 
ly U 
-PU,(l-5)-|3U,, 
(1-5)(X-UJ 
yy u 
Q 
yy (3.21) 
I r . .  c .  U l y U 2 v ( l - c J ) ^  
ai -  —[-Ui2(l-<^+ rf ].  
i.1 Uyy 
(3.22) 
_ _ 1 r /»T / ,  ^lyUivCl-^., ( 2 2  -  — +  ]  
W Uyy 
(3.23) 
(3 24) 
I ^ Iv ^ vc 
n u yy 
(3.25) 
I /^2yUye(l ^ /WT /-I f iM 
=-^[ 
'yy 
(3.26) 
where 
Uiv 2 yJui(i-^2 
" = [Uu-77^ + AJ22(I-'5)— ^ 
u yy u 
] •  
yy 
(3.27) 
The demand function given by equation (3.20) has a very generalized form. It can generate 
the demand for non-addictive goods as a special case with 5=1. In the event that 5=0 and the 
intercept is suppressed, equation (3.20) reduces to the rational addiction demand equation 
derived by Becker et al. because they suppress the intercept in their theoretical model. This is 
another difference between their model and equation (3 .20). 
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Addictive versus Non-Addictive Goods 
Consider equation (3.20) for the special case that 6=1. This is the case of complete 
and instantaneous depletion of the addictive stock. In this case ai=a2=as=0. Thus, equation 
(3.20) reduces to equation (3.28). 
C, = tto + ttjP, -H a^e^ (3.28) 
Equation (3.28) states that in the case of complete and instantaneous depreciation, the 
dynamic demand equation for the good is independent of past consumption. In other words, 
the model yields a demand equation for a non-addictive good as a special case of the 
generalized model for addictive goods. If 5<1, then the addictive stock does not decay 
completely, and the demand for the addictive good is given by equation (3.20). Current 
microeconomic models require separate utility maximization problems to be specified in order 
to derive the demand for both addictive and non-addictive goods. This model provides a 
single utility maximization problem for the derivation of an agent's demand functions 
regardless of the addictive nature of the good. In addition, the addictive sub case of this 
approach does not sacrifice the ability of the model to distinguish between myopic and 
rational consumption patterns. 
The Impact of Addiction Information on Cigarette Demand 
It is the premise of this dissertation that the revelation of addiction information about a 
particular good serves to make consumers aware of the implications of current consumption 
decisions for future choices and, consequently, on future utility levels. In the absence of 
addiction information about a good that is addictive, consumers have to rely on their past 
consumption experience of the good. They adjust their current consumption levels to 
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maximize current utility while compensating for the effects of tolerance, reinforcement and 
withdrawal due to past consumption. However, consumers do not account explicitly for the 
effects of present consumption on future utility until they are informed that the good is 
addictive. In other words, consumers carry out a one-period utility maximization process 
subject to an addictive stock constraint and a one-period budget constraint. When consumers 
are explicitly made aware of the future consequences of current consumption, it is then that 
they adjust their current consumption levels to be consistent with a forward looking multi-
period utility maximization process subject to an addiaive stock constraint and a lifetime 
budget constraint. The next sub-section considers the demand for an addictive good by a 
consumer that is not explicitly aware of the addictive nature of the good. Then the demand 
functions of an informed and an uninformed agent are compared and contrasted. 
Myopic vs. Rational Behavior 
The reasoning behind myopic models of addiction as summarized by Becker et al. is 
that agents have a higher rate of time preference for the present and, thus, tend to ignore the 
future implications of current consumption. However, Becker et al. theorize that agents are 
forward looking and do consider the future effects of consuming an addictive good. Their 
empirical findings and those of Chaloupka support this notion. 
The competing myopic and rational models of addiction can be reconciled under a 
fi^mework that considers the nature of addiction information available to agents. In this 
study, agents are hypothesized to exhibit myopic behavior in the consumption of addictive 
goods when they are not explicitly informed of the addictive properties of the good. Once 
they are told about the addictive nature of the good, agents are hypothesized to consider the 
future implications of current consumption. It is now appropriate to demonstrate that the 
current theoretical model retains the ability of the Becker et al. model to nest a myopic model 
of addiction within the rational model. 
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Myopic or Uninformed Demand 
Consider a forward looking agent who is consuming an addictive good without the 
explicit information about the effects of current consumption on future utility. The relevant 
optimization procedure is the following one period static utility maximization model: 
MaxU(CtAt YtCt) 
Ct Yt 
subject to At = Yj + P^Ct and Aj = (I - 5)Ct_i. (3-29) 
The Lagrangian for this myopic maximization problem is given by; 
L = U(Ct,(l-£^Ct_uYt.et) + A{At -  Yt -PtCt). (3.30) 
The associated first order conditions are: 
U,^(C,(l-6)C,_,Y,e.) = A. (3.31) 
Uct (Ct,(l-^Ct_i,Yt,et) = APf (3.32) 
Given the quadratic utility function expressed in equation (3.16), equations (3.31) and (3.32) 
can be solved in the same way as equations (3.17) and (3.18) to yield the following myopic 
demand function: 
c ,  =eo+0 ,c , - ,+e ,p .+e3e , .  (3 .33 )  
The 0 coefficients are defined as: 
^ -[U,U„ + U, rx-u)] 
00 = . (3.34) 
[U„U„-Ufj 
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_ -(•-^)[Ul2Uyy-UlyU2y] ^ 3 5 ,  
'  [UllUyy-Ufy] 
0 2 =  (3 36) 
[UiiU^-Ufy] 
-[UleUw -UivUve] 03= (3-37) 
[UllUyy-Ufy] 
If 5=0 and the intercept is suppressed, equation (3.33) coincides with ±e Becker et al. 
version of a myopic demand function for an addictive good. The motivation for the Becker et 
al. version of the myopic model is that it is a sub case of the rational addiction model given an 
agent with a very high rate of time preference for the present (i.e., P=0). On the other hand, 
the version of the rational addiction model in this dissertation posits that even agents with a 
low rate of time preference for the present will exhibit myopic consumption behavior unless 
they are explicitly informed about the future implications of current consumption of the 
addictive good. In feet, one can argue that a disclosure of information about the addictive 
properties of a good will prompt a switch in the pattern of consumption precisely because 
agents become forward looking. When agents become aware of the future implications of 
current consumption of the addictive good, they will adjust their consumption patterns to 
maximize their utility over several future time periods resulting in a switch from a myopic to a 
rational pattern of consumption. The current model can also be used to predict changes in the 
magnitude of coeflBcients of the demand equation. The next sub-section examines the 
magnitude and direction of the changes in the coeflBcients of the demand equation following 
the dissemination of addiction information. 
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Testable Implications of the Theory 
A switch from a myopic to a rational demand function following the release of 
addiction information is posited in this work. This hypothesis yields the following testable 
implications. Prior to the release of addiction information, demand should take the myopic 
form indicated in equation (3.33); and after the information is released, the demand function 
we observe should resemble the rational demand function in equation (3.20). In other words, 
when agents are unaware of the future consequences of consuming an addictive good, their 
current quantity demanded is independent of future consumption. However, when agents are 
aware of the additive nature of a good then current and future consumption decisions are 
linked together. 
In order to examine the direction and the magnitude of the changes of the coefficients 
when agents switch from a myopic to a rational regime, it is useful to compare and contrast 
the corresponding coefficients from equations (3.20) and (3.33). In keeping with Chaloupka 
(1991), it is assumed that the amount of the addictive good consumed and the amount of the 
addictive stock do not affect the marginal utility of the composite good. In other words: 
The Influence of Past Consumption on Present Consumption 
Using equation (3.38) and (3.27) to simplify equations (3.22) and (3.35), respectively, 
yields; 
Uly — U2y — 0. (3.38) 
(3.39) 
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(+) (+) 
Uii 
(-) 
(3.40) 
A comparison of (3.39) and (3.40) shows that 0i is greater than at. In other words, after the 
release of addiction information when agents switch from myopic to rational consumption 
patterns, the ability of a unit of last period's consumption to increase this period's 
consumption declines. 
The Influence of Future Consumption on Current Consumption 
In a myopic model the effect of next period's consumption on current consumption is 
nil because in a myopic model agents do not consider the future effects of current 
consumption. In a rational model, however, future consumption does influence current 
consumption. In keeping with Becker et al., the model developed in this paper predicts that 
current and future consumption will be adjacent complements. This can be seen by examining 
the sign of the coefBcient on future consumption in equation (3.23). Using equation (3.38) to 
simplify equation (3.23) yields: 
The Influence of Price on Present Consumption 
Once again, use equation (3.38) and (3.27) to simplify the coefiBcients of price in the 
myopic and rational demand equations given by equations (3.36) and (3.24), respectively. 
The simplified expressions for these coefBcients are given by: 
(+) (+) (+) 
ai = 5->0-
Uii+ /?U22(1-^^ 
(-) (+)(-) (+) 
(3.41) 
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^7 = 
(+) 
A. 
Uii 
(-) 
< 0  (3.42) 
«3 = 
(+) 
A 
Uii+ p U22(i-^' 
(-) (+)(-) (+) 
<0 (3.43) 
A comparison of equations (3.42) and (3 .43) shows that in absolute value 02 exceeds 
QLi. The model predicts that the release of addiction information which prompts consumption 
patterns to switch from myopic to rational causes a dampening of the effect of current price 
on current quantity demanded. This result can be interpreted in terms of elasticities. The 
current period own-price elasticity at the means is defined by: 
C, 
(3.44) 
where and are the average current period price and quantity, respectively. Because 02 
exceeds as in absolute value and using equation (3.44), it can be shown that the current period 
own price elasticity at the mean for a myopic agent exceeds that of an otherwise identical 
rational agent in absolute value given that Ct is the same in both cases. 
^MYOPIC = 
• Pt 
___ 62 . P t  > 
C, 
. P t  
Ct Ct Ct 
-^RATIONAL (3-45) 
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Simulating Consumption via tiie Demand Equation 
Another contribution of the theoretical model derived in this study is that it presents 
an avenue to simulate past, current and future consumption using the solution to the 
difference equation given by (3.20). This equation is a second-order difference equation in Ct. 
The temporal nature of this equation becomes evident when it is manipulated to rotate all 
terms containing C to the left-hand side and is recursed back by one time period. This is done 
in equation (3.46). 
C,., - a,C^., - aX, = tto + ttjP,,, + a^e,., + (3.46) 
The general solution to equation (3.46) is given by equation (3.47). 
C. = A,*; H- AjCti; + , ,. - j) + . - Z W t  +  j )  ( 3  4 7 )  
(j)i and (J)2 are the roots of the homogeneous version of equation (3.46), Ai and A2 are 
constants that are to be determined using initial conditions, C° is the initial value of 
consumption and h(t) is an abbreviation for the exogenous variables on the right-hand side of 
equation (3.46). The details of solving equation (3.46) to obtain equation (3.47) are 
presented in Appendix C. The expressions for (j)i, <j)2 and h(t) are given by equations (3.48), 
(3.49) and (3.50), respectively. 
2a, 
1 +Jl-4a,a, 
= —i- LJ. (3.49) 
2a, 
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h(t) s  tto +a3P,_, +a^e,_, +a5e, (3.50) 
It should be noted that the general solution presented in equation (3 .47) yields the 
complete solution to the difiference equation derived in this study only under the following 
specific assumptions. 
A2 = 0 (3.51) 
h(-s) = 0Vs>0 (3.52) 
One can use equations (3.50), (3.51) and (3.52) to manipulate equation (3.47) to obtain 
equation (3.53). 
r , ^ \ C, = 
—.J ..iw-i) 
TTir-rri'f'ii'a+j) (353) 
Cti<j'i(<t'2 't'l) j=i 
Equation (3.53) is the complete solution to the difference equation given by equation (3.46). 
The details of deriving equation (3.53) from equation (3.46) are also contained in Appendix 
C. The solution to the difference equation is a fiinction of the truly exogenous variables in the 
model developed in this study. It can be used to sunulate the impact of addiction information 
on cigarette consumption. The parameters in equation (3.53) can be calculated by using the 
coefiBcients of the demand equation (3.46). The solution given by equation (3.53) yields the 
Becker et al. solution to equation (3.53) only under a further specific assumption. The 
derivation of the Becker et al. solution as a sub case of equation (3.53) is described in detail in 
Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an empirical model that operationaiizes the 
theory. The first section of this chapter outlines an empirically estimable demand equation 
that allows for structural shifts in both the slope and the intercept coeflBcients of the demand 
fiinction. Next, the issue of cigarette smuggling and its impact on the demand for cigarettes 
will be discussed. The demand equation will be modified to account for the impact of 
smuggling variables. Then the focus shifts to a detailed description of the data set and 
construction of the variables. The next section discusses the relevant econometric 
procedures. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the expected signs of the 
estimated coefiBcients in the demand equation. 
Econometric Implementation of Structural Shift 
One of the main objectives of this model is to test whether the release of addiction 
information in 1979 impaaed the pattern of cigarette consumption in any significant way. In 
this study it is hypothesized that in the absence of addiction information, agents will exhibit 
myopic consumption patterns. However, once they are given information on the addictive 
properties of the good, they will switch to rational patterns of consumption. As explained in 
the previous chapter, such a switch in consumption patterns is evidenced by a change in the 
magnitude of the coefScients of past consumption, future consumption and price in the 
demand equation. Moreover, this switch in consumption patterns implies that future 
consumption becomes a significant variable in the post-information demand function. For the 
reader's convenience the myopic demand function fi-om equation (3.33) and the rational 
demand function fi-om equation (3.20) are reproduced here as equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
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Cj = 00 +-0,C(_, +92Pt +03®t (4.1) 
Ct = CLo +a,C,_, +aX,., +a3P, +a^e, +a5e,^, (4.2) 
Because myopic demand is a sub case of the rational addiction demand functioa, one 
can operationalize the hypothesized structural changes in the demand function by specifying a 
regression equation which allows one to model the changes in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients of the rational addiction demand function. This is done by modifying equation 
(3.20) to include a dummy variable INFO which, if significant, will alter the magnitudes of the 
post-information era regression coefficients. ENFO takes on a value of zero for any year prior 
to 1979 and a value of one for the years 1979 and beyond. This modified specification is 
given by equation (4.3): 
Q = Tio + (TI, + Y,INFO)C._, + (Ti: + Y:INF0)C,^, + (TI3 + yjINFO)?^ + s,. (4.3) 
The operationalization of equation (4.2) can be explained succinctly if the right hand side of 
equation (4.3) is multiplied out. 
In equation (4.4) the impact of each right hand side variable is split into two parts. 
The Ti's show the impact of the variable on consumption prior to the release of addiction 
information and the sum of the corresponding ti's and y's show the impact of the same 
variables after the release of addiction information, e is the error term generated by the 
absence of the unobservables Ct and Ct+i in the regression equation. The predicted signs of the 
Q ='no+Ti,Q_, +Y,(INFO»Q_,) + r|X^^, +y,(INFO»C,,,) 
+113^1 +Y3(INF0»P,) + e (4.4) 
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y's will be inferred based upon the hypothesis of a switch from a myopic to a rational model. 
The pre-information and post-information coefiBcients are sununarized in Table 4.1. 
A switch from a myopic demand function of the form depicted in equation (4.1) to a 
rational demand function shown in equation (4.2) has the following implications for the y's. 
According to equations (3.39) and (3.40) 0i is greater than ai. Hence, the predicted sign of 
Yi is negative. Similarly, from equations (3.42) and (3.43) it is apparent that aj exceeds 02. 
Thus, the predicted sign of ys is positive. Finally, since Ct-i is not included in the myopic 
model its coeflBcient in the pre-information years is zero. In other words, if the hypothesis of 
myopia in the pre-information era is accurate, TI2 in equation (4.4) will not be significantly 
different from zero. However, in the post-information years the coeflBcient of Ct-i (r |2+ yj) in 
the rational demand equation is predicted to be positive. This prediction is based on equation 
(3.41) where QLI is signed positive. Hence, in the post-information years the predicted sign of 
y2 is positive. 
Table 4.1. Pre-information and Post-information Coeflicients 
. Pre-information Post-information 
CoeflBcient CoeflBcient 
C,-i Til =01 Tii + yi = ai 
Ci. K j  Tl2 Ti2+y2=a2 
Pt Tl3 = 02 Tl3+ y3 = as 
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A summary of the expected signs of these is given in Table 4.4 which appears at the 
end of this chapter. A discussion of the constant term will be presented after a description of 
the data. Next, equation (4.2) will be modified to control for the effects of interstate cigarette 
smuggling. 
Adjusting for Interstate Smuggling Bias 
This purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of addiction information on 
consumers across the United States. Hence, the data set, which will be described in detail in 
the next section, is comprised of annual time-series data for the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia in the United States. Per capita consumption is measured by annual per capita sales 
in each state given by the number of packs sold. Cigarette prices are given by average retail 
prices per pack. These prices are inclusive of state and federal taxes. As a result of 
significant differences in state excise taxes, there is a financial incentive to smuggle cigarettes 
fi'om lower-tax states to higher-tax states for resale or consumption. Since per capita 
consumption is proxied by per capita cigarette sales, it is important to account for the impact 
of interstate smuggling on per capita cigarette sales. A failure to do so would result in states 
with low cigarette excise taxes having overstated per capita consumption and states with high 
cigarette excise taxes having understated per capita cigarette consumption. According to 
Greene (1997), the omission of relevant smuggling variables which are correlated with state 
excise taxes that are contained in average retail prices will lead to biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates. 
In order to construct proxies that capture the effects of interstate cigarette smuggling, 
it is usefijl to briefly describe the incentives for the different types of cigarette smuggling that 
exist. Becker et al. (1994) mention two different types of smuggling: short-distance and 
long-distance smuggling. Short-distance smuggling refers to the actions of cigarette 
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consumers who live in high-tax states but purchase cigarettes in neighboring lower-tax states 
for consumption at home. This type of smuggling is only convenient for consumers who live 
suflSciently close to the border of one or more low-tax states. The behavior of these agents 
has also been referred to as "casual smuggling" by Thursby and Thursby (1994). Becker et al. 
also describe a more organized smuggling effort which they term "long-distance smuggling." 
This refers to the practice of organized attempts by distributors to purchase cigarettes in the 
low-tax states of Virginia, North Carolina and Kentucky and ship these cigarettes to other 
states where they are sold at existing retail prices. Thursby and Thursby refer to this as 
"conmiercial smuggling." They provide an analysis of the economic incentives that motivate 
commercial smuggling. Cigarette distributors legally purchase tax-paid cigarettes in one or 
more of the aforementioned low-tax states. Then they bribe the wholesaler in the low-tax 
state not to afiBx the local tax indicia. Next, they arrange for the cigarettes to be smuggled 
into various high-tax states where the cigarettes are tagged with counterfeit indicia for 
payment of state taxes which are never made. Finally, they sell these cigarettes at the local 
prices prevailing in the higher-taxed states. Becker et al. devise different proxies for both 
short and long-distance smuggling. Because the data set used in this study is quite similar to 
theirs, a detailed description of their smuggling proxy variables is in order. 
Becker et al. proxy casual or short-distance smuggling using two different indices: 
SDTIMP and SDTEXP. SDTIMP for the ith state is defined as: 
SDTIMPi=X;M'' 'f-Ti) (4.5) 
j 
In equation (4.5) state i is the state with the higher state tax rate, and state j is any bordering 
state with a lower cigarette excise tax. SDTIMP proxies the incentive for agents in a higher-
tax state to cross the border and purchase cigarettes in a reasonably close lower-tax state. 
Note that the summation is only taken over neighboring states with lower cigarette excise 
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taxes than the home state, kjj is the ratio of the number of people living in the higher-tax state 
(state i) within a distance of twenty miles of the lower-tax state (state j) to the total 
population of the higher-tax state (state i). These weights were computed from the 1995 
TIGER/Line CD Bureau of the Census (1995). Ti is the real state cigarette excise tax per 
pack in the higher-tax state, and Tj is the real state cigarette excise tax per pack in the lower-
tax state. These tax rates are taken from The Tax Burden on Tobacco. Tobacco Tax Council 
(1996). The sign of the variable SDTIMP is predicted to be negative when included in the 
regression equation (4.4) because as the positive tax differential between the home state and 
any lower-tax neighboring state grows, more consumers find it worth their time to cross the 
state line to purchase cigarettes. Thus, the per capita sales in the high-tax state will fall. Per 
capita consumption in the high-tax state may stay the same but more of the cigarettes 
consumed will be purchased across the border. Hence, the variable SDTIMP is included in 
the regression equation to control for these effects. 
The incentives for a lower-tax state to be a casual exporter of cigarettes are captured 
by the variable SDTEXP. 
SDTEXP; = y kji (T - T^ )POPj / POP; (4.6) 
j 
In equation (4.6) state j is the higher-tax state, state i is the lower-tax state, and kj; is the ratio 
of the number of people living in the higher-tax state (state j) within twenty miles of state i to 
the total population of state j. These ratios were also computed from the 1995 Current 
Population Reports. Note that the summation is only taken over neighboring states with 
higher cigarette excise taxes than the home state. Tj is the state cigarette excise tax per pack 
in the higher-tax state, and Tj is the state cigarette excise tax per pack in the lower-tax state. 
The border weights are multiplied by the ratio of POPj, the total population of the people in 
the higher-tax state, to POPi, the population of the people in the lower-tax state. The product 
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of kji and (POPj/POP;) results in a ratio which expresses the population of the higher-tax state 
that lives within twenty miles of the lower-tax state as a fraction of the lower-tax state's total 
population. The reasoning behind this weighting scheme is as follows. Ceteris paribus, a 
larger border population in the high-tax state would potentially mean that more consumers 
would cross the border and purchase cigarettes in the low-tax state. Thus, the fraction of per 
capita sales in a low-tax state attributable to across the border customers would move in the 
same direction as the across the border population. However, a larger home population in the 
low-tax state might mean that a larger fraction of low-tax state per capita sales were 
attributable to purchases by low-tax state residents. Thus, in order to compensate for these 
competing effects, the tax differential between the two states is weighted by the ratio of the 
across the border twenty mile population of the high-tax state to the population of the low-tax 
state. The sign of the variable SDTEXP is predicted to be negative when included in 
regression equation (4.4) because the across the border sales (and hence, per capita sales in 
the lower-tax state) will increase as the tax difference gets larger. However, the reason for 
the negative sign is that this tax difference is expressed as a negative number. Ceteris paribus, 
as the higher-tax state's tax rate increases or its border population increases, the fraction of 
per capita sales in the lower-tax state attributable to non-resident purchases increases. Hence, 
the variable SDTEXP is included in the regression equation to compensate for these effects. 
Becker et al. proxy the effects of long-distance smuggling on per capita sales via a 
single index which picks up both commercial export and commercial import effects. 
Commercial smuggling is done by cigarette sellers, and this is why purchase decisions by 
consumers in high-tax states are independent of the tax differentials between their home state 
and the long-distance exporting states of Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina. This index 
LDTAX is defined differently for the three states. 
Commercial smuggling is undertaken for profit motives. Becker et al. assume that it is 
only profitable to smuggle cigarettes into states that are within one thousand miles of 
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Kentucky, Virginia or North Carolina. States that are more than a thousand miles from 
Kentucky, Virginia or North Carolina are assumed not to engage in commercial smuggling. 
In other words, for states that are more than a thousand miles away from Kentucky, Virginia 
and North Carolina, the variable LDTAX takes a value of zero. In addition to this, Becker et 
al. assume that all states that lie to the west of Kentucky with a higher cigarette excise tax rate 
than Kentucky and within a thousand miles smuggle cigarettes in from Kentucky. This 
assumption makes sense because, of the three states, Kentucky lies farthest to the west. Table 
4.2 gives a detailed list of states that are recipients of cigarettes that are smuggled in from 
Kentucky and Virginia and North Carolina. The expression for LDTAX for the western 
states within a thousand miles of Kentucky is given by equation (4.7). 
LDTAX,. =(Ti-TKY) (4.7) 
Hence, the incentive for the ith western state to smuggle cigarettes in from Kentucky is 
proxied by the difference between the cigarette excise tax in state i and the cigarette excise tax 
in Kentucky of the year in question. The predicted sign of LDTAX in equation (4.7) is 
negative for the following reasons. Ceteris paribus, as the tax differential widens, more and 
more cigarettes will be smuggled into state i from Kentucky, and the share of domestic sales 
in per capita consumption in state i will decline. If the tax rate in state i is lower than the tax 
rate in Kentucky, it is assumed that no cigarettes are imported from Kentucky, and LDTAX is 
set to zero for that state. 
Becker et al. also assume that Virginia and North Carolina share the amount of 
cigarettes that are commercially smuggled into all states that lie to their northeast and 
southeast and are also within five hundred miles of North Carolina and Virginia. The 
expression for the LDTAX variable for these states is given by equation (4.8). 
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Table 4.2 Recipients of Commercially Smuggled Cigarettes 
Kentuclq^ Importers Virginia and North Carolina Importers 
Arkansas Alabama 
Illinois Connecticut 
Iowa Delaware 
Kansas Florida 
Louisiana Georgia 
Michigan Indiana 
Minnesota Maryland 
Missouri Massachusetts 
Nebraska Mississippi 
Oklahoma New Hampshire 
Wisconsin New Jersey 
New York 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Vermont 
Washington D.C 
West Virginia 
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LDTAXi = Z^cCTi - V) + ZvaCT; - Tv.J (4.8) 
Equation (4.8) indicates that in any state i with a higher tax rate than either North Carolina or 
Virginia or both smuggling occurs from either one or both states . If the tax rate in state i is 
lower than the tax rate in an exporting state (i.e.. North Carolina or Virginia), it is assumed 
that no cigarettes are imported from that state, and the tax diflferential between state i and the 
exporting state is set to zero. The proportion of the cigarettes smuggled in from either North 
Carolina or Virginia into state i is proxied by the sum of the weighted tax differentials 
between the cigarette excise taxes in state i and those of North Carolina and Virginia, 
respectively. The weights ZNC and ZVA are given by equations (4.9) and (4.10), respectively. 
2 _ (Value added in NC) 
(Value added in NC + Value added in VA) 
2 _ (Value added in VA) 
(Value added in NC + Value added in VA) 
These weights are the ratios of the value-added from tobacco produced in each state 
to the sum of the value-added from tobacco production in both states. The value-added from 
tobacco production in each state was determined by taking an average over the years 1955-
1964. Data for these years were obtained from the 1994 U.S. Tobacco Statistics (Creek, 
Capehart and Grise, 1994). Data for later years were not available. Once again the sign of 
the variable of LDTAX is predicted to be negative for reasons similar to those discussed 
previously. Ceteris paribus, as the tax differential widens, more and more cigarettes will be 
smuggled into state i from North Carolina and/or Virginia and the share of domestic sales in 
per capita consumption in state i will decline. 
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It is now time to examine how to account for the impact of commercial smuggling 
activities on the per capita sales of the states of Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina. The 
LDTAX variable is also used to adjust per capita sales in Kentucky to reflect that a certain 
proportion of in state purchases are actually smuggled across the border and are not 
consumed in the state of Kentucky. The expression for LDTAX for the state of Kentucky is 
given by equation (4.11). 
^ POP. 
LDTAX^,=X(Tky-T,)- ^ 
POP, 
(4.11) 
KY 
Note that the summation is taken over all potential importing states j that have a higher 
cigarette excise tax than Kentucky. The tax differential between Kentucky and state j is 
weighted by the ratio of the population of state j to that of Kentucky. This is presumably 
because a larger tax differential will prompt more commercial smuggling of cigarettes from 
Kentucky to state j. A larger population of state j (POPJ) will perhaps lead to a larger market 
for smugglers to cater to while, ceteris paribus, a larger population of the state of Kentucky 
(POPKY) might mean that a larger fraaion of per capita Kentucky cigarette sales are actually 
consumed in Kentucky. 
The LDTAX variable for North Carolina and Virginia is calculated in a very similar 
fashion to that of Kentucky. The formulas for the computation of the LDTAX variable for 
the state of North Carolina and Virginia are given by equations (4.12) and (4.13). 
LDTAX^^ = 
POP, NC 
(4.12) 
LDTAX^^ = y(T -T)-^^ (4.13) 
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Equations (4.12) and (4.13) are quite similar to equation (4.11), but they are different in that 
they are weighted by the value-added ratios given in equations (4.9) and (4.10). The reason 
for the value-added weighting is the assumption that North Carolina and Virginia share the 
amount of the commercial cigarettes smuggled into the northeastern and southeastern states. 
For a complete list of these states refer to Table 4.2. The reasoning for the population ratio 
weighted tax differentials is the same as that explained above for the state of Kentucky. The 
sign of the variable LDTAX for the three states of Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina is 
predicted to be negative when included in regression equation (4.4) because the amount of 
cigarettes smuggled out of these states should vary in the same direction as the positive gap in 
taxes between the importing state and the low-tax exporting state. However, the tax 
differential is always a negative number because it is the lower-tax state's tax minus the 
higher-tax state's tax. Thus, the predicted sign of LDTAX is negative for the three long­
distance commercial exporting states. 
In order to control for the effects of both casual and commercial smuggling, the 
variables capturing the tax differential (SDTIMPt, SDTEXPt and LDTAXt) are included in 
regression equation (4.4). The modified regression equation is given by equation (4.14). The 
predicted signs of the smuggling variable coefiBcients (ri4, ns and qs) are all negative. This 
modified regression equation now controls for interstate smuggling bias in the same way as 
Becker et al. In addition, post-information era structural breaks are specified for the 
smuggling variables in the same way that they were specified for the consumption and price 
variables in the model. The theory of rational addiction does not predict any structural breaks 
in the coefiBcients of the smuggling variables. However, since smuggling activity is related to 
cigarette sales in each state, the structural breaks for the smuggling variables are included for 
completeness. 
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Q = T1o+TiiC,_, +Y,(INFO*C^_,) + TI,C,,, +Y, (INFO •€,.,) 
+T]3Pj +y3(INFO*Pt) + Ti5SDTIMPt ^yjCINFO *SDTIMPt) +rigSDTEXPt 
+y6(INF0 • SDTEXPt) + ri^LDTAX^ + y^CINFO * LDTAX^) + e, (4.14) 
In keeping with Becker et al., the only other variable that is included in the regression 
equation is annual state specific per capita disposable income INCt along with its post-
information era structural break specified in the same way that it was specified for the 
consumption and price variables in the model. Once again the theory does not predict a 
structural break in income, but nonetheless, one is specified for completeness. The complete 
regression equation is given by equation (4.15). 
Ct = no+TiiC,_, +y,(INFO»C,.,) + Ti,C,., +y,(INFO ^C,^,) 
+n3Pt + YjCINFO • PJ + Ti4lNCt + y4(INF0 * INC,) + TIjSDTIMPj 
+y 5 (INFO • SDTMP,) + rigSDTEXP, + y ^  (INFO * SDTEXP,) 
+Ti7LDTAX,+y7(INFO*LDTAX,) + et (4.15) 
A Description of the Data 
The data set used in this model is comprised of state disaggregated armual time-series 
data for all the fifty states and the District of Columbia for a period of 1955-1994. This data 
set essentially extends the data set used by Becker et al. by a period of nine years. The data 
set is at the per capita level with a total of 1,989 potential observations. After eliminating 
observations due to missing sales and price data, the actual number of observations is reduced 
to 1,925. The details of the states missing sales and price data are contained in Table 4.3. 
Consumption Ct in equation (4.15) is measured by per capita tax-paid cigarette sales in packs. 
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These sales are reported for the fiscal year mnning fi-om July 1 to June 30. The data are taken 
fi-om The Tax Burden on Tobacco. The Tobacco Tax Council has obtained these data by 
means of a sample survey conducted in all states and the District of Columbia since 1954. 
Because the consumption reported is for a fiscal year, it spans approximately half of 
each of two consecutive calendar years. It is for this reason that the price deflator that is used 
for calendar year t is a simple average of the 1982-1984 consumer price index for all 
commodities for the years t-1 and t. This series is taken fi*om The Economic Report of the 
President. 
Table 4.3. States with Missing Data 
State Years with Missing Data 
Alaska 1955-1959 
Hawaii 1955-1960 
California 1955-1959 
Colorado I955-I964 
Maryland 1955-1958 
Missouri 1955 
North Carolina 1955-1969 
Oregon 1955-1966 
Virginia 1955-1960 
(1995). This price deflator is used to convert all nominal prices and taxes to their 
corresponding real values. Price Pi in equation (4.15) for year t is measured by the average of 
the year t-1 and t average retail prices reported by the Tobacco Tax Council. The state 
specific annual weighted average price per pack is calculated by the Tobacco Tax Council as 
follows. The average is taken over both the type of sale (i.e., single pack price, carton price 
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and vending machine price) and over the different types of cigarettes sold (i.e., regular, king 
size, filter tip, etc.). This price is inclusive of state and federal excise taxes. 
The state cigarette excise taxes that are used in the construction of the smuggling 
variables are weighted averages constructed fi-om the state cigarette excise taxes reported by 
the Tobacco Tax Council for each fiscal year. The weights are the firactions of the fiscal year 
for which each rate has been in effect. The population figures for each state that are used in 
the construction of the smuggling variables are taken fi-om the Current Population Reports for 
various years. Income INCt in equation (4.15) for a state in year t is measured by the average 
of the year t-1 and t state specific per capita disposable income. These figures are taken fi-om 
the Survey of Current Business (Various Years). Finally, it is appropriate to discuss the 
econometric procedures used to run the regressions. 
Estimation Procedures and Instruments Used 
Because the data set consists of state-specific time-series, a fixed effects model that 
employs state-specific and annual dummies is used. This is in keeping with the procedure 
used by Becker et al. who employed a similar data set. The annual dummies pick up the 
yearly effects of health information and the recent media coverage of the tobacco industry, 
while the state dummies compensate for the diversity in demographic composition, income 
and other state specific variables that may be correlated with cigarette consumption. 
Another similarity in the estimation with Becker et al. arises fi-om the fact that the 
variables Cn and Ct+i in equation (4.15) are endogenous. As Becker et al. point out the 
endogeniety becomes apparent when the dependence of Cm on et in the first order conditions 
given by equations (3.13) and (3.14) is explored. Furthermore, they reject the null hypothesis 
of consistent OLS estimates at the one percent level using a De-Min Wu F-test. Further 
arguments in support of the endogeneity of Ct-i and Ct^i come from Chaloupka. In keeping 
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with Chaloupka, a perusal of the closed fonn solution to the difference equation given by 
equation (4.2) shows that consumption at any point in time depends on several future and past 
prices. However, the regression equation (4.15) does not contain any leads or lags of price. 
A potential solution to the endogeneity problem will involve estimating Cn and Ct-i 
using various instrumental variables. Some of these instruments may be lagged and lead 
values of prices and taxes. In keeping with Becker et al., several different sets of instruments 
will be used. In general, two different sets of instruments are available. The former contains 
both lag and lead values of prices and taxes as instruments while the latter contains only the 
lag values of prices and taxes. 
Becker et al. favor the sets of instruments that use both the lag and lead values of the 
price and tax variables. They are opposed to using instrument sets that omit future prices and 
taxes because they maintain that future prices and taxes are good indicators of future 
consumption. They state that cigarette tax hikes are publicized in advance thereby giving 
consumers a fair idea about fiiture prices. They argue that to omit the one period lead values 
of prices and taxes from the set of instruments might lead to a loss of valuable information. 
Furthermore, they claim that the lagged values of prices and taxes are not good predictors of 
future prices. However, Becker et al. admit that if consumers have poor forecasts of future 
prices, then the forecast error in future price will create a downward bias in the coefBcient of 
future consumption. Finally, they argue that another reason to use future prices and taxes as 
instruments is that models that use these instruments are much less sensitive to changes in the 
specification of the structural demand equation. Thus, regressions using both sets of 
instruments will be considered. 
Another concern is the presence of Serial Correlation and Heteroscedasticity. Becker 
et al. computed a variance-covariance matrix that was adjusted for the effects of serial 
correlation. They claim that the corrected standard errors were not very different from the 
standard errors that were obtained without the correction. They also used weighted least 
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squares to correct for the effects of any heteroscedasticity that may have been present. Once 
again, they report that their results do not change significantly. Since the data set that is used 
here is essentially an extension of the Becker et al. data the concerns regarding serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity have already been addressed by the analysis performed by 
Becker et al. The chapter concludes with Table 4.4 which summarizes the expected signs of 
the estimated coefBcients in the demand equation. 
Table 4.4. Regression Coefncients and their Predicted Signs 
Variables Regression Predicted Sign 
Ct-, Hi Positive 
Q.i Tl2 Zero 
Pt ^3 Negative 
INCt n4 Indeterminate 
SDTIMPt Tl5 Negative 
SDTEXPt He Negative 
LDTAXt Negative 
INFO»C,-i Yi Negative 
INFO*Ct,i Y2 Positive 
INFO*Pt Y3 Positive 
INFO*INCt Y4 Indeterminate 
INFO*SDTIMPt Ys Indeterminate 
INFO*SDTEXPt Y6 Indeterminate 
INFO*LDTAXt Y7 Indeterminate 
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CHAPTER 5. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to report the empirical results based on the theory and 
methods developed in the previous chapters and to discuss the implications of these findings. 
The chapter begins with an outline of the choice of different sets of instruments used in the 
various regressions. Next, the results fi-om the various regression runs will be presented. The 
implications of these results will be discussed. Thereafter, the regressions results fi^om 
estimating the Becker et al. model using the updated dataset will be presented and compared 
to the empirical results of the model developed in this study. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with an overview of the simulations that were performed using the closed form solution to the 
difference equation developed in the theory chapter. 
Choice of Instnimental Variables 
The regression equation (4.15) that was developed in Chapter 4 contains two right 
hand side variables that are endogenous. This equation is reproduced here for convenience as 
equation (5.1). 
Ct =t1o+ti,Q_,+Y,(INF0»C..,) + Ti2Q^, +Y,(1NFO*C,^,) 
+Ti3Pt + y3(lNFO * PJ + Ti4lNCj + Y4(INF0 • INCt) + tijSDTIMP^ 
+Y5(INF0 » SDTIMPt) + TigSDTEXP, + Y6(nS'FO * SDTEXPJ 
+Ti7LDTAXt+Y7(INFO*LDTAXi) + e^ (5.1) 
As Chapter 4 points out, past consumption Cn and future consumption Ci*i depend on 
several past and future prices which are absent fi-om the regression equation. Thus, Ct-i and 
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Ct-i are not truly exogenous. When faced with the same problem, Becker et al. devise several 
different sets of instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of past and future 
consumption. They use different combinations of lags and leads of cigarette prices and excise 
taxes along with the other explanatory variables in the model. This study uses a similar 
approach. The different combinations of lag and lead prices and taxes used by Becker et al. 
are replicated along with all the other explanatory variables. The details of the different sets 
of instrumental variables are contained in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. There are four different sets of 
instrumental variables labeled model (i) through (iv). In the context of these tables, X,.i refers 
to the ith lag of the variable X, and refers to the ith lead of the variable X. The variable T, 
refers to annual state cigarette excise tax per pack. Table 5.1 contains both lead and lag 
values of the price and tax instruments used. Table 5.2 contains only those instrumental 
variable combinations that do not use any lead values of prices or taxes. In addition to the 
various leads and lags of prices and taxes, each set of instruments also contains all other 
explanatory variables in the model. 
The estimation procedure used is two-stage least squares which is perhaps best 
explained using an example. Consider performing the two-stage least squares procedure 
using model (i) in Table 5.1. This involves regressing each endogenous variable Cm and Ct-i 
separately on all the truly exogenous variables in equation (5.1), i.e., Pt, (INFO*Pt), INCi, 
(INFO*INCt), SDTIMPt, SDTEXPt, LDTAX,, (INFO»SDTIMPt), (INFO*SDTEXPt), 
(INFO*LDTAXt) and the instruments Pn and Pt+i. The predicted values from each of these 
first stage regressions are stored. Next, a second OLS is run on equation (5.1). However, 
rather than using the actual values of Cn and Ct+i in the regression, their predicted values 
obtained from the first stage regressions are used. The estimates of the coefBcients from this 
second stage are referred to as the two-stage least squares estimates. On the other hand, the 
OLS procedure estimates equation (5.1) using the actual values of Cn and Ct^i and all the 
other variables. These estimates are referred to as model (v). 
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Table 5.1. Sets of Lag and Lead Instruments for C(.i and 
Model Instruments Used 
(i) Pt-i and Pt-i 
(ii) Pt-i, Pi*i Tt and T,.i 
(iii) Pt-i, Pt-i T., T,.i and T t-i 
(iv) Pt-2, Pt-i, Pi-i Tt, Tt-i, T i-i and Tt.z 
Table 5.2. Sets of Lag Instruments for Ci.i and Ci+i 
Model Instruments Used 
Pt.i and Pt.2 
Pi-i, Tt and Tt.i 
Pi-2j Pt-i7 Tt, Tt-i and Tt.2 
Summary of Regression Results 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
In keeping with Becker et al., equation (5.1) was estimated using ordinary least 
squares and the seven different sets of instruments that are outlined in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
The results are presented in Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. The instrumental variables used in 
the regressions from Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain both lag and lead values of prices and taxes. 
The next sub-section will report estimates of the rational addiaion model with structural 
breaks using sets of instruments that contain lag and lead values of prices and taxes. Next, the 
economic implications of these results will be discussed. The following sub-section reports 
estimates of the rational addiction model with structural breaks using sets of instruments that 
contain only lag values of prices and taxes. The last sub-section will report estimates from a 
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restricted rational addiction model with structural breaks. The restrictions are generated by 
imposing fixed values of the time preference parameter p. 
Regressions that Use Both Lag and Lead Instruments 
Table 5.3 presents the regression coeflBcients tji through n? and yi through of 
equation (5.1). The estimates in columns (i) through (iv) correspond to instrument sets (i) 
through (iv), respectively, as described in Table 5.1. Column (v) gives the ordinary least 
squares estimates of equation (5.1). The corresponding statistic and sample size N are also 
reported. The asymptotic two-tailed t-ratio accompanying each coefficient is reported 
beneath it in parentheses. Estimates of the state and time dummies for model (iv) are given in 
Appendix D. Table 5.3 presents the estimated slope coeflBcients in some detail. However, for 
the purposes of interpretation, it is beneficial to use these coeflBcients to obtain the pre-
information and the post-information regression coeflBcients for each set of instruments. 
Table 5.4 presents one such description of the results contained in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.4 reports the pre-information and post-information coeflBcients for equation 
(5.1) in accordance with the procedures outlined in Table 4.1. The pre-information 
coefficients in Table 5.4 are given by the ri's fi"om Table 5.3. The post-information 
coeflBcients reported in Table 5.4 are generated by the sum of the corresponding ri's and y's 
fi-om Table 5.3. The statistic is also carried over fi-om Table 5.3. In addition to this. Table 
5.4 reports the estimates of the time-preference parameter P and its corresponding real 
interest rate r. 3 and r will be discussed in detail in a later section. 
A systematic perusal of Table 5.4 allows one to grasp the implications of the 
econometric results for the theory. The left half of the table gives the estimates of the demand 
equation parameters in the pre-information years (pre-1979 coeflBcients), and the right half of 
the table gives the parameters of the demand equation pertinent to the post-information years 
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Table 5.3. Estimates of Cigarette Demand with Structural Brealcs 
Lags and Leads Included in Set of Instruments 
Variables 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
CoefBcients' ZSLS" 
(0 (ii) (iii) (iv) 
OLS"= 
(V) 
C.-I 
Pt 
INCt 
SDTlMPt 
SDTEXPt 
LDTAXt 
INFO*Ct.i 
INFO*C t+i 
INFO*Pt 
INFO*INCt 
Hi 
Tl2 
Tl3 
Tl4 
TIs 
Tie 
Tl7 
Yi 
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Y4 
INFO*SDTIMPt Ys 
INFO*SDTEXPt Ys 
rNFO*LDTAXt y? 
N 
0.557 
(7.438) 
0.054 
(0.607) 
-34.886 
(-6.752) 
0.184 
(4.467) 
-59.116 
(-5.826) 
-60.478 
(-8.503) 
-8.773 
(-5.666) 
-0.246 
(-2.862) 
0.294 
(3.360) 
15.305 
(3.357) 
-0.211 
(-5.577) 
11.024 
(1.149) 
14.518 
(1.963) 
-0.655 
(-0.855) 
0.445 
(6.411) 
0.105 
(1.210) 
-39.473 
(-7.600) 
0.223 
(5.328) 
-59.513 
(-5.665) 
-65.938 
(-9.212) 
-9.670 
(-6.163) 
-0.169 
(-2.02) 
0.232 
(2.694) 
17.350 
(3.663) 
-0.258 
(-6.944) 
5.828 
(0.585) 
16.384 
(2.12) 
-0.717 
(-0.890) 
0.509 
(7.845) 
0.013 
(0.172) 
-41.633 
(-7.833) 
0.227 
(5.197) 
-64.894 
(-6.105) 
-69.743 
(-9.654) 
-10.597 
(-6.751) 
-0.248 
(-3.193) 
0.314 
(3.938) 
18.511 
(3.766) 
-0.269 
(-6.992) 
8.027 
(0.776) 
18.338 
(2.288) 
-0.764 
(-0.908) 
0.562 
(9.696) 
0.056 
(0.784) 
-34.290 
(-7.354) 
0.180 
(4.631) 
-58.706 
(-6.001) 
-59.726 
(-9.382) 
-9.059 
(-6.289) 
-0.248 
(-3.500) 
0.291 
(4.012) 
15.545 
(3.500) 
-0.205 
(-6.179) 
10.344 
(1.082) 
13.872 
(1.905) 
-0.920 
(-1.178) 
0.489 
(32.380) 
0.437 
(27.090) 
-10.833 
(-3.849) 
0.061 
(2.241) 
-27.821 
(-4.132) 
-24.906 
(-6.902) 
-1.226 
(-1.522) 
0.001 
(0.392) 
-0.008 
(-0.255) 
3.469 
(1.059) 
-0.030 
(-1.633) 
12.145 
(1.702) 
-1.315 
(-0.241) 
-0.229 
(-0.383) 
0.970 
1925 
0.967 
1925 
0.964 
1925 
0.971 
1874 
0.982 
1925 
* Intercepts for model (iv) are reported in Appendix D. 
'' Columns (i)-(iv) give 2SLS estimates with instruments described in Table 5.1 
® Column (v) gives an OLS estimate. 
Table 5.4 Pre and Post-lnrormation Estimates or Cigarette Demand 
Lags and Leads Included in Set of Instruments 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
RHS PRE-1979 COEFFICIENTS 
Variables Reg 2SLS'' OLS' 
(V) 
Reg 2SLS'' OLS'= 
(V) Coef (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Coef (i) 00 (iii) (iv) 
CM ni 0.557 0,445 0.509 0.562 0.489 ni'h'i 0.312 0.276 0.261 0.314 0,491 
(7.438) (6,411) (7.845) (9.696) (32.380 (6.913) (6,020) (5.514) (7.500) (17,656) 
c.., n2 0.054 0,105 0.013 0.056 0,437 ^2+12 0.348 0,338 0.328 0.347 0,429 
(0,607) (1.210) (0.172) (0.784) (27.090 (9,081) (8.448) (7.902) (9.240) (15,170) 
P. n3 -34.886 -39.473 -41.633 -34.290 -10.833 -19,581 -22.123 -23.122 -18,745 -7.365 
(-6.752) (-7.600) (-7.833) (-7.354) (-3.849 (-4.824) (-5.287) (-5.323) (-4.827) (-2.627) 
INC, n4 0.184 0.223 0.227 0.180 0.061 ^4+74 -0.027 -0.035 -0.042 -0.025 0.031 
(4.467) (5.328) (5.197) (4.631) (2.241 (-0.895) (-1.105) (-1.266) (-0.820) (1.369) 
SDTIMP, ns -59.116 -59,513 -64,894 -58.706 -27.821 ns+Ts -48.092 -53.685 -56.868 -48,362 -15.676 
(-5.826) (-5.665) (-6,105) (-6.001) (-4.132 (-5.409) (-5.885) (-6.053) (-5,732) (-2,714) 
SDTEXP, Tie -60.478 -65.938 -69.743 -59.726 -24.906 He-^76 -45.960 -49.554 -51.405 -45,854 -26.221 
(-8.503) (-9.212) (-9.654) (-9.382) (-6.902 (-5,008) (-5.178) (-5.163) (-5.087) (-3.868) 
LDTAX, n? -8.773 -9.670 -10.597 -9.059 -1.226 Ti7-hr7 -9,428 -10.386 -11.361 -9,979 -1.455 
(-5.666) (-6.163) (-6.751) (-6.289) (-1.522) (-5.101) (-5.500) (-5.949) (-5.612) (-1.340) 
0.970 0.967 0.964 0.971 0,982 0,970 0.967 0.964 0,971 0,982 
P 0.097 0.237 0.026 0.099 0,894 1.115 1.224 1.258 1,105 0,875 
r 9,342 3.227 36.931 9.107 0.119 -0.103 -0.183 -0.205 -0,095 0.143 
POST-1979 COEFFICIENTS 
* Intercepts for model (iv) are reported in Appendix D. 
^ Columns (i)-(iv) give 2SLS estimates with instruments described in Table 
' Column (v) gives an OLS estimate. 
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(post-1979 coefiBcients). Once again, the coefiBcients in any particular column correspond to 
the estimates obtained by using the set of instruments indicated by the column number. 
In the pre-information years the estimates of the coeflBcient of past consumption (riO 
range from 0.445 to 0.557, and in the post-information years the estimates of the coefiBcient 
of past consumption (iii-Hjrj) range from 0.261 to 0.491. These estimates are all positive in 
sign and significant at the one percent level. Thus, the results show that past consumption is a 
positive and significant variable both in the pre-information and in the post-information years. 
These findings support the theoretical prediction of a positive coefficient on past consumption 
for an addictive good. 
In the pre-information years the estimates of the coefficient of future consumption (r,2) 
range from 0.013 to 0.437. These estimates are also always positive in sign. In the pre-
information years with the exception of the OLS estimate reported in column (v), all the 
coefficient estimates of future consumption are not significantly different from zero at the one 
percent level of significance. In other words, the results suggest that agents are myopic in the 
pre-information period. In the post-information years the estimates of the coefficient of 
fliture consumption ('n2"+T2) range from 0.328 to 0.429. These estimates are all positive in sign 
and statistically significant at the one percent level. With the exception of the OLS estimates, 
the results show that future consumption becomes a significant variable in the post-
information years, whereas it is not significant in the pre-information years. These results 
support the hypothesis maintained in this study that agents are myopic in the pre-information 
period due to a lack of information, but become rational after the release of addiction 
information. 
The estimates of the coefficient of price are all negative and significant at the one 
percent level. They range from -34.886 to -10.833 in the pre-information period and from 
-23.122 to -7.365 in the post-information period. In general, they decrease in absolute value 
between the pre-information and the post-information period. These findings support the 
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theoretical prediction of a negative coeflBcient on price in both periods. Furthermore, they 
support the prediction that the coefiBcient of price in the post-information period will be 
smaller in absolute value than its pre-information counterpart. 
The estimates of the coeflBcient of income range from 0.061 to 0.227 in the pre-
information period and are all significant at the one percent level, except for the OLS case 
which is significant at the five percent level. However, in the post-information period the 
estimates of the coeflBcient of income, with the exception of the OLS estimate, are negative in 
sign. In this period they are also not significantly different from zero at the five percent level. 
Thus, in general, with the exception of the OLS case, the coeflBcient of income appears to 
switch signs and lose significance in the post-information period. The theory does not make 
any predictions about the magnitude or the significance of the coeflBcient of income. 
The coeflBcients of the three smuggling indices are all negative in sign in both periods. 
With the exception of a couple of OLS estimates, they are also always significant at the one 
percent level. The structural breaks in the estimates of the coeflBcients (ys and ys) of the casual 
smuggling indices SDTIMPt and LDTAX, reported in Table 5.3 are not significantly different 
from zero at the five percent significance level. However, the estimates of the coeflBcients of 
the commercial smuggling index SDTEXPt do exhibit a significant structural break. This 
results in an increase in absolute value of the coeflBcient of the commercial smuggling index 
SDTEXPt between the pre-information and the post-information period. Because these 
indices are not considered in the theoretical model, there are no a priori expectations about 
the magnitudes or signs of the coeflBcients of the structural breaks for these variables. 
In general, the y coeflBcients are significant as a group. The null hypothesis of all the 
y coeflBcients being zero is rejected at the one percent level of significance for models (i) 
through (iv). The calculated F-statistics for these models (i) through (iv) are; 5.59, 7.31, 8.31 
and 7.03 respectively. The large F-statistics merely reconfirm the significance of the presence 
of structural breaks indicated by the large t-statistics for individual y coeflBcients. 
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Economic Implications of tiie Regression Results 
The regression results from Table 5.4 hold several implications for the theory. The 
coeflBcient of past consumption always enters the regression equation with a positive sign. 
This is in keeping with the notion that a higher level of past consumption will spur an increase 
in current consumption for an addictive good. This coefiBcient is positive and significant in 
both the pre-information and the post-information periods. Thus, the regressions support the 
theoretical notion of the addictiveness of nicotine regardless of the availability of addiction 
information. These results provide empirical evidence that refutes the tobacco industry's 
claims that cigarettes are not addictive. 
The coefficient of future consumption is not significantly different from zero in the 
pre-information period. However, in the post-information period it is positive and significant 
at the one percent level. This lends credibility to the hypothesis that once consumers are 
explicitly informed of the future consequences of consuming an addictive good, their current 
choices do reflect a consideration of the impact of those choices on their future satisfaction. 
In other words, in the absence of addiction information, consumers tend to make myopic 
consumption choices, but once informed of the addictive nature of the good, they make 
rational choices that display an explicit consideration of the future impact of current 
consumption. 
A perusal of the estimates of the coeflBcient of price suggest that an increase in the 
price per pack of cigarettes would lead to a decline in the per capita consumption of cigarettes 
both in the pre-information and in the post-information period. However, in the post-
information period the decline in the absolute value of the price coeflBcient estimates for ail 
sets of instruments suggests that after the addictive properties of nicotine are disclosed, a 
price cut loses some of its sales generating ability. In other words, cigarette consumers who 
are not aware of the addictive properties of nicotine are likely to increase consumption by a 
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greater amount in response to a price cut than if they were aware of the addictive aspects of 
nicotine. A given rise in prices due to an increase in cigarette taxes would not generate as 
large a decrease in consumption in the post-information period as it would in the pre-
information period. Thus, the results seem to imply that the efiScacy of cigarette taxes as a 
deterrent is mitigated by the presence of addiction information. 
The two-stage least squares estimates of the coeflBcient on income suggest that 
cigarettes switch from normal to slightly inferior or income neutral good after the disclosure 
of the addictive properties of nicotine. In other words, a rise in income for a consumer in the 
pre-information period will be accompanied by an increase in per capita cigarette 
consumption, whereas a rise in income for a consumer in the post-information period will be 
accompanied by a slight decrease in per capita cigarette consumption. 
The estimates of the coeflBcients of all the smuggling indices are negative and 
significant in both the pre-information and the post-information time periods. These findings 
suggest that both casual and commercial smuggling were prevalent in both time periods. The 
only estimates that display a structural break between the two periods are the estimates of the 
variable SDTEXP. 
The empirical results support the theory quite strongly. The two-stage least squares 
results are not sensitive to the choice of instruments specified in Table 5.1. The hypothesized 
shift from a myopic to a rational pattern of consumption is observed. In the post-information 
period the magnitude of the impact of past consumption on current consumption is predicted 
to decline and this is supported by the negative sign on the estimates of yi for all sets of 
instruments Table 5.3. Furthermore, the prediction of a drop in the power of price to 
stimulate consumption in the post-information period is supported by a positive sign on the 
estimates of 73 for all sets of instruments in Table 5.3. 
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Regressions that Use Only Lag Instruments 
In keeping with Becker et al., a second series of regressions was ain using 
instrumental variables that excluded any lead values of prices and taxes. The instrument sets 
are designated (vi) through (viii) and are described in detail in Table 5.2. The results from 
these regressions are presented in Table 5.5. Next, these regression results are rephrased to 
state the corresponding pre-information and post-information coeflBcients. The pre-
information and post-information coefBcients are represented in Table 5.6. The construction 
of Table 5.6 from Table 5.5 is completely analogous to that of Table 5.4 from Table 5.3. 
The results from this second set of regressions are less favorable. The pre-information 
estimates are the most troublesome. The estimates of the coefiBcient of past consumption are 
negative but insignificant; the price coefiBcient estimates are positive and significant in two out 
of three regressions. In addition, the estimates of the coefBcients of each of the casual 
smuggling indices (SDTIMPt and SDTEXPt) are negative in only one out of three regressions 
while the estimated coefiBcient of the commercial smuggling index (LDTAXt) is always 
positive. However, these regressions do ofifer some support for the model in that the pre-
information period estimates of the coefiBcient of fixture consumption are positive and 
significant in all three regressions. 
The post-information coefBcients do ofifer limited support for the theory. While the 
estimates of the coefiBcients on both past and fiiture consumption are always positive and 
significant, the estimates of price are negative and significant in only two out of three 
regressions. The estimates of the coefBcients of each of the casual smuggling indices still 
have the wrong signs in the majority of the regressions. 
Becker et al. had similar problems with the second set of regression instruments as 
well. However, they argue that any set of instruments that attempts to predict fiiture 
consumption without a consideration of fiiture prices or taxes is inherently flawed, and as 
such, not much weight should be placed on the results of these regressions. This is because 
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Table 5.5. Estimates of Cigarette Demand with Structural Breaks 
Only Lags are Included in Set of Instruments 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Variables CoefiBcients 2SLS * 
(vi) (vii) (viii) 
Ct-i Til -1.157 -0.011 -0.140 
(-0.809) (-0.066) (-0.854) 
Ct+i Tl2 2.841 0.953 1.245 
(1.284) (3.359) (4.660) 
Pt Tl3 46.090 -9.547 2.357 
(0.758) (-0.885) (0.243) 
INCt ^4 -0.031 0.115 0.073 
(-0.175) (2.168) (1.394) 
SDTIMP, Tl5 22.751 1.333 5.142 
(0.934) (0.348) (1.467) 
SDTEXP, Tie 118.690 -3.990 18.499 
(0.845) (-0.196) (0.912) 
LDTAXi Tl7 78.471 -17.738 2.404 
(0.746) (-1.051) (0.156) 
INFO*Ct-i Yl 2.060 0.504 0.724 
(1.107) (2.193) (3.239) 
INFO*CtM Yz -2.141 -0.497 -0.741 
(-1.099) (-2.008) (-3.135) 
INFO*Pi Y3 -27.376 1.990 -3.854 
(-0.795) (0.298) (-0.566) 
INFO»INCt Y4 0.263 -0.068 0.017 
(0.765) (-0.958) (0.268) 
INFO»SDTIMPt Ys 2.443 -0.128 0.550 
(0.713) (-0.162) (0.552) 
INFO*SDTEXPt Y6 -51.793 -7.615 -14.433 
(-0.875) (-0.730) (-1.135) 
INFO*LDTAXt Y7 -54.179 -6.749 -16.462 
(-0.976) (-0.646) (-1.502) 
0.759 0.970 0.957 
N 1874 1925 1874 
* Columns (vi)-(viii) give 2SLS estimates with instruments described in Table 5.2 
Table 5.6 Pre and Post-Information Estimates of Cigarette Demand 
Only Lags are Included in Set of Instruments 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
RHS 
Variables 
PRE-1979 COEFFICIENTS POST-1979 COEFFICIENTS 
Reg 
Coef 
2SLS* Reg 
Coef 
2SLS* 
(vi) (vii) (viii) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
CM ni -1.157 -0.011 -0.140 li+Yi 0.903 0.494 0,584 
(-0,809) (-0.066) (-0,854) (2.013) (5.999) (7.575) 
Cj.i 2.841 0.953 1.245 12+72 0.700 0.457 0,504 
(1.284) (3.359) (4.660) (2.433) (8,473) (8,905) 
P, 13 46.090 -9.547 2.357 13+73 18.714 -7,557 -1,497 
(0.758) (-0.885) (0.243) (0.634) (-1,231) (-0.251) 
INC, n4 -0.031 0.115 0,073 14+74 0.232 0,047 0.090 
(-0.175) (2.168) (1.394) (1.092) (1,171) (2.028) 
SDTIMP, ns 118,690 -3.990 18.499 15+75 66.897 -11,605 4.066 
(0,845) (-0.196) (0.912) (0.755) (-0,734) (0.267) 
SDTEXP, 16 78.471 -17.738 2.404 16+76 24.292 -24,487 -14.058 
(0,746) (-1.051) (0.156) (0.418) (-2,015) (-1.091) 
LDTAX, 17 22,751 1.333 5,142 17+77 25.194 1,205 5.693 
(0,934) (0.348) (1.467) (0.930) (0,292) (1.428) 
0,759 0.970 0,957 0,759 0.970 0,957 
P -2.456 -89.631 -8.867 0.775 0.925 0,863 
r -1.407 -1,011 -1.113 0.291 0,081 0,158 
'Columns (vi)-(vlii) give 2SLS estimates with instmments described in Table 5.2 
90 
they are based on incomplete sets of instruments. The next section will discuss the results 
from the estimation of a restricted rational addiction model with structural breaks. 
Estimates of the Restricted Rational Addiction Model with Structural 
Breaks 
The time preference parameter P, as stated in Chapter 3 in equation (3.10), is the rate 
at which the agent discounts the contribution of a future period's utility to the sum of the 
present discounted value of the utility stream. P can be recovered from the coeflBcients of the 
regression equation. This is demonstrated in Appendix C. In any particular regression 
equation it is given by the ratio of the coeflBcient of future consumption Ct-i to the coeflBcient 
of past consumption Ct-i. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.6 also report the time preference parameter P and its associated 
interest rate r. In Table 5.4 (the regressions with both lag and lead instruments) the two-stage 
least squares estimates of the pre-information P range from 0.026 to 0.099 and the 
correspondmg interest rates range from 3693 to 910.7 percent. These values of P are 
implausibly low, while the accompanying interest rates are implausibly high. However, the 
post-information estimates of P are implausibly high. They range from 1.105 to 1.258, and 
the corresponding interest rates range from -9.5 percent to -20.5 percent. In Table 5.6 (the 
regressions with only lag instruments) the two-stage least squares estimates of the pre-
information P range from -89.631 to -2.456 and the corresponding interest rates range from 
-101 percent to -140.7 percent. The post-information estimates of P range from 0.775 to 
0.925 and the corresponding interest rates range from 29 percent to 8.1 percent. Apart from 
these last estimates, the estimates of P, in general, are troubling because they either imply 
interest rates that are too high or they imply negative interest rates. The interest rates 
obtained by these regression estimates cast suspicion on the robustness of the model. Becker 
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et al. admit to having a model which does not produce very plausible estimates of the time 
preference parameter 3 and, consequently, of the real interest rate r. 
Becker et al. report that the values of the time preference parameter (3 implied by their 
regression estimates are implausibly low. In order to investigate the robustness of their 
model, they redo the estimation with values of P fixed at plausible levels. Since the results 
from Table 5.4 show that the rational addiction model with structural breaks suffers from the 
problem of high interest rates in the pre-information period and negative interest rates in the 
post-information period, the model was re-estimated using values of P fixed at more plausible 
values. Only model (iv) was re-estimated. The results from these regressions are reported in 
Table 5.7. 
The basic findings that are reported in Table 5.4 remain unaltered by the imposition of 
different values of P ranging from 0.75 to 0.95. These values of P correspond to interest rates 
of 0.33 and 0.05, respectively. As the results in Table 5.7 show, there is still a shift from a 
myopic to a rational pattern of consumption after the release of addiction information. The 
influence of past consumption on current consumption gets stronger after the release of 
addiction information. The influence of price on current consumption declines in the post-
information period compared to its influence on consumption in the pre-information period. 
The smuggling indices retain their negative signs as predicted by the theory. In essence, the 
imposition of reasonable discount factors does little to undermine the empirical support for 
the rational addiction model with structural breaks. 
Empirical Results from the Becker et al. Rational Addiction Model 
This section presents the results from estimating a rational addiction demand equation 
without structural breaks over the time period 1955-1994. This model is just the Becker et al. 
model estimated using the updated data set developed for this study. The estimates from the 
'i'ahle 5.7 Pre and Post-liiruriiiaUoii Estimates of Cigarette Demand, 
witli exogeiioiisly imposed values of p 
Lags and Leads Included in Set of Instruments ' 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
PRE-1979 COEFFICIENTS POST-1979 COEFFICIENTS 
RIIS Rcg r-()4.1 r=0.1.1 r=0,25 r-0.18 r-0.11 r-0,05 Reg r-0 41 r-0.11 r-0,25 r=0,18 r=0 11 r-0.05 
Variables CocfT |1=0.7() H=0.75 |i=0,80 )1=0.85 |i=0.90 |1=().95 Cocn" H-0.70 H-0,75 H=0.80 |i=0,85 |l=0.90 |1=0.95 
c., 
•ll 0.567 0,566 0 566 0.565 0.564 •ll '7i 0,191 0.180 0.169 0,159 0.350 0.340 
(').K«).l) (9.««) (9,861) (9.842) (9 819) (9.794) (18,022) (18,068) (18.097) (18 III) (18.112) (18.103) 
C.M n2 OdKl 0.07K 0,074 0.070 0.066 0.062 0,191 0,180 0.169 0,159 0.350 0.340 
(0.820) (0,815) (0.842) (0.844) (0.841) (0.812) (18.022) (18068) (18.097) (18 III) (18.112) (18.103) 
P. n? -VI761 -11.751 -11.772 -11 816 -11.880 -11.961 •1.1 '7. -18 995 -18,899 -18.827 -18.776 -18.743 -18.725 
(-7 .104) (-7,11) (-7,119) (-7 111) (-7.145) (-7.159) (-4.911) (-4,907) (-4.887) (-4.872) (-4.859) (-4.850) 
INC, 0.171 0.172 0.171 0,174 0,175 0.176 
•1.1 '7i -0 012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.029 -0.028 -0.027 
(4 455) (4.482) (4.511) (4,541) (4,571) (4.601) (-1,061) (-1021) (-0.986) (-0.953) (-0.923) (-0.901) 
SDTIMI', 
'Is -5« 809 -58,747 -58644 -58,581 -58.554 -58.556 •Is'7^ -48 401 -48.259 -48,169 -48,121 -48.115 -48.138 
(-6.065) (-6,052) (-6.042) (-601.1) (-6.026) (-6.02) (-5,778) (-5 765) (-5,755) (-5,750) (-5.743) (-5.740) 
SDTEXP, 
•16 -5«.«56 -58,855 -58.897 -58.974 -59.080 -59.211 •16 '7. -46 155 -46.004 -45.896 -45.824 -45.783 -45.769 
(-9.132) (-9,144) (-9,159) (-9.176) (-9,194) (-9411) (-5,160) (-5,145) (-5 111) (-5.122) (-5.114) (-5.106) 
l.DTAX, M7 -« 972 -8955 -8 948 -8.951 -8 961 -8 978 •i7 'y -9,814 -9 804 -9 805 -9 816 -9 836 -9.863 
(-6.276) (-6,27) (-6,269) (-6 271) (-6,277) (-6.286) (-5 565) (-5,565) (-5.570) (-5 580) (-5.588) (-5 600) 
R- 0.971 0,971 0,971 0.971 0,971 0.971 0 971 0 971 0,971 0 971 0.971 0.971 
° These Regressions were run using the set ofinsliumenls from model (iv) desciibed in Table S 1 
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regressions run on this model using the instrumental variables described in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
are reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. In keeping with the empirical findings in 
Becker et al., the regressions that use both lag and lead instruments (columns (i) through (iv) 
in Table 5.8) provide more support for the rational addiction model than the regressions that 
exclude fixture prices and taxes as instruments (columns (vi) through (viii) in Table 5.9). 
The regressions labeled (i) through (iv) in Table 5.8 support the hypotheses that 
cigarette consumers are rational by the presence of positive estimates of the coefficient of 
future consumption. Furthermore, the positive estimates of the coeflBcient of future 
consumption provide support for the hypothesis that cigarettes are an addictive good. The 
negative estimates on the coefiBcient of price also support the theoretical predictions about the 
impact of price on current consumption. However, the coefiBcient of income is negative in 
two out of four regressions, whereas for the empirical results of Becker et al. which employs 
data from 1955-1985, the estimates of the coeflBcients of income are positive for all sets of 
instruments. The coeflBcients of the smuggling indices have the predicted negative signs. 
One of the problems with the rational addiction model proposed by Becker et al is that 
the estimates of 3 inferred from the two-stage least squares estimates in Table 5.8 are 
implausibly low. They range from 0.34 to 0.62. In turn, these low values of P imply 
implausibly high values of the interest rate ranging from about sixty percent to one hundred 
and ninety-eight percent. 
The regressions labeled (vi) through (viii) in Table 5.9 are also problematic for the 
Becker et al. rational addiction model. As is the case with the empirical model used in this 
study, some estimates of the coefiBcient of past consumption are negative, and one estimate of 
the coefiBcient of future consumption is insignificant at the five percent level. In two out of 
the three regressions, price has a negative coefiBcient. As Becker et al. point out, these 
aberrations are probably attributable to the use of an incomplete set of instrumental variables. 
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Table 5.8 Rational Addiction Model without Structural Breaks 
Lags and Leads Included in Set of Instruments 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
RHS 
Variables 
2SLS 
illl (iii) (iv) 
OLS 
(V) 
Ct-i 
Cfi 
Pt 
INC, 
SDTIMPt 
SDTEXP, 
LDTAX, 
0.517 
(9.041) 
0.173 
(2.729) 
-29.279 
(-7.489) 
-0.002 
(-0.084) 
-47.213 
(-6.700) 
-55.012 
(-9.321) 
-6.748 
(-5-591) 
0.396 
(7.685) 
0.247 
(4.001) 
-33.265 
(-8.379) 
0.010 
(0.355) 
-49.277 
(-6.752) 
-59.033 
(-9.744) 
-7.006 
(-5-619) 
0.457 
(9.881) 
0.162 
(3.104) 
-35.212 
(-8.742) 
-0.003 
(-0.121) 
-53.466 
(-7.281) 
-62.813 
(-10.360) 
-7.926 
(-6.45) 
0.513 
(12.470) 
0.188 
(3.932) 
-27.795 
(-7.946) 
0.000 
(-0.004) 
-46.458 
(-6.946) 
-53.765 
(-9.962) 
-6.857 
(-5.986) 
0.489 
(36.760) 
0.441 
(31.160) 
-9.558 
(-4.281) 
0.038 
(1.799) 
-20.382 
(-4.128) 
-25.633 
(-7.321) 
-1.326 
(-1.743) 
P 
r 
N 
0.974 
0.335 
1.988 
1925 
0.972 
0.624 
0.603 
1925 
0.970 
0.354 
1.821 
1925 
0.975 
0.366 
1.723 
1874 
0.982 
0.902 
0.109 
1925 
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Table 5.9 Rational Addiction Model without Structural Breaks 
Only Lags are Included in Set of Instruments 
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses) 
RHS 2SLS 
Variables (vi) (vii) (viii) 
CM -0.872 0.095 0.060 
(-0.792) (1.087) (0.676) 
Ct+i 2.441 0.861 0.988 
(1.432) (5.444) (6.836) 
P. 41.854 -7.561 0.013 
(0.841) (-1.040) (0.002) 
INCt 0.378 0.105 0.134 
(1.280) (2.925) (3.549) 
SDTIMPt 84.651 -7.359 3.446 
(0.876) (-0.597) (0.303) 
SDTEXPt 73.604 -16.776 -4.425 
(0.798) (-1.433) (-0.428) 
LDTAXt 20.686 1.795 3.542 
(1.021) (0.739) (1.622) 
0.780 0.972 0.967 
P -2.799 9.063 16.467 
r -1.357 -0.891 -0.940 
N 1874 1925 1874 
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The next section compares and contrasts the empirical results of this study to those obtained 
from fitting the Becker et al. model to the updated data. 
Contributions of the Rational Addiction Model with Structural Breaks 
Although the Becker et al. model does not specifically account for the impact of 
addiction information on cigarette consumption, the empirical results from their model do 
have some commonalties with the empirical results of the model developed in this study which 
incorporates structural breaks. For the sake of brevity, comparisons and contrasts will only be 
made across the regressions that use future prices and taxes as instruments. In other words, 
the results from Table 5.4 will be compared to those in Table 5.8. 
In general, both sets of results show that the two models agree on the signs of all the 
explanatory variables except for income. However, for each explanatory variable in the 
current study, there is a pre-information and a post-information coefficient. With the 
exception of income, the signs of all these variables in both the pre-information and the post-
information period agree with the signs of the corresponding variables in the Becker et al. 
results. A comparison of the magnitudes of the coefacients on the price, income and 
consumption variables reveals an interesting fact. The estimate of each of the aforementioned 
coefficients from the Becker et al. model is bounded by the corresponding pre-information 
and post-information in the current model. For example, in Table 5.8 the regression (i) 
estimate of the coefficient on past consumption in the Becker et al. model is 0.517. This 
figure is bounded by 0.557 and 0.312, the corresponding estimates of the coefficient of past 
consumption from regression (i) in Table 5.4. This suggests that addiction information does 
have an explicit role to play in the demand equation. 
The Becker et al. model is generally on the right track, but a model that accounts for 
the dissemination of addiction information provides more accurate estimates of the 
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coeflBcients of the explanatory variables in the demand equation. This difference is most 
apparent in the case of the coefiBcient on future consumption. The Becker et al. model 
predicts that agents account for the future impact of addiction information even without the 
knowledge that a good is addictive. For example, in Table 5.8 regression (iv) has an estimate 
of 0.188 for the coefiBcient of fiiture consumption which is significant at the one percent level. 
However, the rational addiction model with structural breaks demonstrates the following. 
When addiction information is explicitly included in the demand equation, then in faa, agents 
who do not know that cigarettes are addictive do not consider the future impact of current 
consumption. For example, in Table 5.4 regression (iv) has an estimate of 0.056 for the pre-
information coefiBcient of past consumption which is not significantly different from zero at 
the five percent level. The structural break model hypothesizes that agents only consider the 
future impact of current consumption after they are made aware of the addictive properties of 
nicotine. For example, the estimate of the post-information coefiBcient on future consumption 
fi-om regression (iv) in Table 5.4 is 0.347, and it is significant at the one percent level. 
Simulations 
The theoretical solution to the difference equation from Chapter 2 is used to simulate 
cigarette consumption fi"om 1963 to 1987 given the assumption that addiction information 
would have been released in 1962 by the cigarette firms. These simulations are described in 
detail in Appendbc E. The general findings are that for the vast majority of states, the 
simulated annual per capita consumption is less than the per capita consumption that was 
actually observed for these states. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A Precis of the Research Effort 
Cigarette consumption has been an oft analyzed topic. The earliest studies in the 
1950s modeled the demand for cigarettes as a non-addictive good. In general, the literature in 
this period treated the quantity of cigarettes demanded as a function of prices, income, 
advertising and taxes. The temporal dimension of current consumption was not considered. 
In the mid 1960s and the early 1970s the first health warnings regarding cigarette 
consumption were issued by the Surgeon General. Furthermore, during this period, 
legislation was passed regarding cigarette labeling and advertising. These events prompted a 
renewed interest in the analysis of cigarette demand. Economists modified the previous non-
addictive models to include annual dummies to pick up the effects of the health warnings and 
legislation. In addition to the health warnings, the Surgeon General informed the American 
public of the addictive nature of nicotine in 1979. 
Once again, cigarette demand was analyzed with renewed vigor. This time, the studies 
attempted to incorporate the fact that the consumption of an addictive good had temporal 
consequences. In particular, current consumption was modeled as a function of past 
consumption in addition to other economic variables such as prices, personal income, taxes 
and advertising. These myopic models varied in their degree of sophistication. The simpler 
models maintained that current cigarette consumption depended on past consumption without 
providing a microeconomic foundation for their claim. Other myopic models provided a 
consistent utility maximization approach to the proposition that past consumption and the 
aforementioned economic variables influenced current consumption. The myopic theory of 
addiction was supported by empirical evidence. In addition to finding significant eflfects of 
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cigarette prices, income, taxes and advertising, past consumption was also found to be a 
positive and significant determinant of current consumption. Thus, cigarette consumers were 
modeled as myopic or short-sighted individuals who did not consider the future consequences 
of their actions. The prevailing intuition of the myopic school was that since cigarettes were 
an addictive good, the quantity demanded would not respond much to changes in economic 
variables. 
Becker and Murphy challenge the above logic. They maintain that economic agents 
are rational and do consider the future effects of their actions. Consequently, these agents do 
consider the future consequences of consuming an addictive good. Becker and Murphy 
incorporated the psychological aspects of tolerance, withdrawal and reinforcement into their 
optimal control theory of rational addiction. Their model implies that current consumption is 
not only influenced by past consumption but also by a consideration of the impact of current 
consumption on future utility. The rational addiction model also implies that economic 
variables such as prices and income could play a larger role in determining consumption than 
previously thought. In addition, the Becker and Murphy model relates the consumption of 
addictive goods to stressful life events and allows for the possibility of quitting cold turkey. 
Finally, this model allows for the possibility of a myopic consumer as a special case of the 
rational addiction model. 
It is the ability of the rational addiction model to nest the myopic model within itself 
that permits the testing of the alternative hypotheses of myopia and rationality. The empirical 
evidence in favor of the rational addiction model is quite strong. The earliest empirical study 
to test the model was conducted by Becker et al. using state disaggregated U.S. armual time-
series data. They find strong support for the rational addiction model. Their results suggest 
that both past and fiiture consumption are appropriate determinants of current consumption. 
Their estimates of long-run price elasticities suggest that cigarette demand is more responsive 
to changes in price than previously thought. Chaloupka also finds additional empirical 
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support for the rational addiction model using a panel data set that spans four years and 
twenty-eight thousand individuals. Chaloupka's model is a generalized version of the Becker 
et al. empirical model. In fact, the Becker et al. model is a special case of Chaloupka's model 
that occurs when the depreciation rate on the addictive stock is one hundred percent. 
Chaloupka finds that past and future prices and consumption are significant determinants of 
current consumption. In addition, he also obtains estimates of long-run elasticties which 
suggest that cigarette demand is quite responsive to changes in price. The findings of these 
studies present a problem for theorists fi'om the myopic school because the myopic model 
does not predict that agents consider the fiiture consequences of their current choices 
concerning addictive goods. The rational addiction model has emerged as the most widely 
accepted theory at the current time because it retains the ability to explain myopic behavior as 
a special case and is supported by strong empirical evidence. 
An implicit assumption in the rational addiction model is that cigarette consumers are 
aware of the addictive nature of cigarettes. Although cigarette manufacturers were aware of 
the addictive properties of nicotine as early as 1962, the information did not become available 
to the general public until 1979 when it was disclosed by the Surgeon General. This set of 
events presents an opportunity to test the impact of addiction mformation on the demand for 
an addictive good. This study posits that the release of addiction information in 1979 served 
to make consumers aware of the implications of current consumption levels for future choices. 
Prior to 1979 in the absence of addiction information about a good, consumers had to rely on 
their past consumption experience of the addictive good. They adjusted their current 
consumption levels to maximize current utility while compensating for the effects of tolerance, 
reinforcement and withdrawal due to past consumption. However, consumers did not 
account explicitly for the effects of present consumption on future utility until they were 
informed about the addictive nature of the good in 1979. Once they were told about the 
addictive properties of the good, agents did consider the implications of current consumption 
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for future utility. In other words, this study posits that a structural break should be observed 
in the demand for cigarettes in 1979. That is, in the absence of addiction information, the 
demand for an addictive good will be myopic and that after the release of addiction 
information in 1979 the demand for the addictive good will be rational. 
The model constructed in this paper empirically modifies the rational addiction model 
to allow for the possibility of structural changes in the demand function which may have 
occurred beginning in 1979 due to the release of addiction information. It reconciles the 
competing models of myopia and rationality by accounting for the availability of addiction 
information to consumers. In addition to this, the theoretical model generalizes the rational 
addiction model to include non-addictive goods. This innovation nests the demand for both 
addictive and non-addictive goods as sub cases of a single demand equation. The subsequent 
rational addiction demand equation that is derived from this model retains the ability to 
distinguish between rational and myopic behavior. This model provides testable implications 
concerning the addictive nature of a good. It predicts that due to the addictive nature of 
cigarettes, past consumption will influence the level of current consumption regardless of the 
availability of addiction information. It also provides testable implications about myopic 
versus rational consumption patterns. Specifically, the theoretical model predicts that the 
impacts of past consumption and price on current consumption will decline after the release of 
addiction information. It also predicts that future consumption will become a significant 
determinant in the post-information rational demand equation. 
The model was tested using U.S. annual state disaggregated time-series data from 
1955-1994. The data set is essentially an updated version of that used by Becker et al.. The 
empirical estimation of the model accounts for the effects of casual and commercial smuggling 
due to diverse state cigarette excise tax rates. This is done by including indices that capture 
the incentives to smuggle cigarettes into and out of each state. 
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Several different regressions were run. They can be broadly classified into four sets. 
The first set of regressions estimates the rational addiction model with structural breaks using 
sets of instruments that contain both lag and lead values of cigarette prices and taxes. The 
second set repeats the estimation using sets of instruments that contain only lag values of 
cigarette prices and taxes. A third set of regressions using different reasonable fixed values of 
the time preference parameter is estimated because the estimates obtained fi^om the first two 
sets of regressions yield implausible estimates of the time preference parameter. The fourth 
set of regressions estimates a rational addiction model without any structural breaks over the 
entire sample. This is essentially an updated version of the Becker et al. regressions. 
The results fi"om the empirical analysis support the theory quite strongly. There is a 
significant structural break in the coefBcients of past consumption, fixture consumption and 
price which occurs in the year that information regarding the addictive aspects of cigarettes 
was released by the Surgeon General. The data are consistent with a myopic model in the 
pre-information period and a forward looking rational model in the post-information period. 
The results suggest that agents who are not explicitly informed of the fixture consequences of 
cigarette smoking do not consider the impact of current choices on their fixture well being. 
However, agents that are explicitly informed about the fixture implications of consuming an 
addictive good do consider the impact of current consumption on fiiture choices when 
determining the amount of current consumption. In addition to the switch fi-om a myopic to a 
rational pattern of consumption, the results also support theoretical predictions of the 
direction and magnitude of the structural breaks in the coefBcients of the key variables. The 
data support the notion that in the absence of addiction information past consumption and 
price will have a larger impact on current consumption than in the presence of this 
information. These findings concur with the logic that when consumers know about the 
fixture impact of current consumption they modify their current consumption levels to ensure 
that they maximize their well being not only in the current time period but also in the future. 
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The data suggest that this modified behavior mitigates the effects of past consumption and 
prices on current consumption levels. The implication for using cigarette taxes as a policy 
tool is that cigarette consumption by consumers who are aware of the addictive nature of 
nicotine will respond less to a tax hike than the consumption levels of those consumers who 
are unaware of the addictive properties of nicotine. The model is robust to exogenously 
imposed time preference rates. The results are not sensitive to choices of the set of 
instruments given that future values of prices and taxes are used to predict future 
consumption. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Researcii 
Although this study does provide several fascinating insights into the impact of 
addiction information on the consumption of an addictive good, it does suffer from some 
limitations. The model presented here does not examine the determinants of the start and quit 
rates of cigarette smokers. Clearly, the revelation of addiction information will have some 
bearing on these rates and on the number of packs consumed by each smoker. The complete 
impact of addiction information on cigarette consumption will not be known until its effect on 
agents' decisions to smoke and to quit smoking is known. This provides an avenue for future 
research. A rational addiction model with structural breaks can be used to analyze the 
probabilities of starting and quitting smoking. In particular the decision of teenagers to start 
smoking can be examined based upon their knowledge of the addictive properties of nicotine. 
However, this type of analysis would require a detailed panel data set. This is another 
limitation of the current study. The data cannot be disaggregated beyond the state level. This 
precludes the ability of the study to track the change in cigarette consumption by specific 
individuals prior to and after the release of addiction information. However, the aggregate 
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nature of the data does provide an overview of the impact of cigarette addiction information 
on the entire U.S. on a state by state basis. 
The current effort develops a solution to the demand equation which appears to point 
out a restrictive assumption employed by Becker et al. and Chaloupka in the construction of 
their solutions to the same equation. This finding presents the possibility of updating the 
numerical estimates of their price-elasticities using the solution developed in this study. 
The current study models the demand for cigarettes without considering the impact of 
substitutes and complements. For example, it does not examine the impact of alcohol 
consumption on cigarette demand. Another direction for future research is that the current 
model can be extended to multiple addictive goods. The interaction between the demands for 
complementary and competing addictive goods can be analyzed. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to examine the impact of addiction information regarding one good on the demand 
for a substitute or complement. The model proposed here is a simple demand equation. A 
possible extension is to construct a larger system of demand equations which models the 
demands for multiple groups of addictive and non-addiaive goods. 
The current study explicitly introduces the depreciation rate as a factor in the addiction 
process. In this model the depreciation rate of the addictive stock is assumed to be a 
biologically determined constant. The tobacco industry has been accused of manipulating 
nicotine levels. Fluctuating nicotine levels in cigarettes may in fact make the depreciation rate 
a variable. Further research incorporating uncertainty with respect to the depreciation rate is 
warranted. 
The availability of low-tar and light varieties of cigarettes offer consumers a choice of 
nicotine levels. This allows for the possibility of an endogenous depreciation rate. The 
current model can be extended to examine the impact of an endogenous depreciation rate on 
the determinants of cigarette demand. 
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Since cigarette smoking is injurious to health, a model that considers an endogenous 
choice of the length of life may also provide insights into consumption patterns of different 
age groups. In the present study, the consumer's lifetime is assumed to be exogenously given. 
However, since cigarette smoking is injurious to health, a smoker chooses both the quantity of 
cigarettes and the expected length of life when deciding how much to smoke. A model that 
explicitly accounts for this phenomenon may have interesting insights to offer regarding the 
levels of cigarette consumption by agents of different ages. 
This model estimates the impact of addiction information on cigarette consumption 
after 1979. However, this information was available to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco 
Company as early as 1962. Another direction for future research would be to use the demand 
equation from the current model to examine the welfare implications for consumers of the 
release of addiction information at the initial date of discovery. 
The current work does provide a benchmark for the impact of addiction information 
on the demand for addictive goods. The model proposed here reconciles the competing 
schools of myopia and rationality by explicitly considering the role of information. It is not 
meant to explain all possible forms of addiction. However, it does offer some insights into the 
consumption of a particular addictive good. 
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APPENDIX A. 
SOLUTION TO CHALOUPKA'S STOCK CONSTRAINT 
This appendix deals with the details of solving the addictive stock differential equation 
(2.23). The solution derived here corresponds to equation (2.25) Chapter 2. Equation (2.23) 
is reproduced here as equation (Al.l). 
A(t) = -^ = C(t)-5A(t) (Al.l) 
at 
For any general linear differential equation with non-constant term such as the one given by 
equation (A1.2), the complete solution is given by the sum of the general solution and the 
particular solution as in Chiang (1984). This solution is given by equation (A1.3). 
y(t) + uy(t) = W(t) (A1.2) 
t 
y(t) = e-^'[y(0) + JW(v)e®Mv] (A1.3) 
0 
Equation (Al. 1) is solved using equation (A1.3) by making the following substitutions: 
u = 5 (A1.4) 
y(t) = A(t) (A1.5) 
W(t) = C(t). (A1.6) 
Equations (AI.3), (A1.4), (AI.5) and (AI.7) taken together yield equation (A1.7). 
A(t) = e-®'[A(0) + }c(v)e®Mv] (A1.7) 
0 
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Equation (A1.7) corresponds to the solution presented in the literature review chapter in 
equation (2.25). 
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APPENDIX B. 
SOLUTION TO THE GENERALIZED DISCRETE STOCK 
CONSTRAINT 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the details of the solution to the discrete 
time addictive stock constraint in Chapter 3 given by equation (3.4). This equation is 
reproduced here as equation (Bl. 1). 
At=(l-(J)Ct_i+(l-^)At_i (Bl.l) 
The solution to this equation is obtained by recursion. Consider expressions for At for t= 1,2, 
3 etc. Consider the expressions for At given by equation (Bl. I) for t= 1, 2, 3 and 4. The goal 
is to notice a pattern and to find a general expression for A,. 
t=l 
A, =(1-6)Co+(1-5)AO (B1.2) 
t=2 
Aj =(l-5)C,+(l-5)Ai (B1.3) 
Equations (B1.2) and (Bl.3) can be combined to yield equation (B 1.4). 
Aj = (I - 5)Ci + (I - 5)[(1 - 5)Co + (1 - 5)Ao] (B1.4) 
Equation (B1.4) can be simplified and expressed as equation (B 1.5). 
AJ = (1 - 5)C, + (1 - 6)^C„ + (1 - 5)'AO {B 1.5) 
For t=3, the expression for A3 is given by equation (B1.6). 
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Aj =(1-6)C3+(1-5)A2 (B1.6) 
Equation (B1.6) can be further simplified by substituting out for Aj, using equation (B1.5) 
and gathering like terms. The result is given by equation (Bl.7). 
A3 =(1-5)C2+(1-5)^C,+(1-5)^Co+(1-5)^Ao (Bl.7) 
For t=4, the expression for At is given by equation (B1.8). 
A4 = (1-5)C4+(1-5)A3 (B1.8) 
Equation (B 1.8) can be fiirther simplified by substituting out for A3 using equation (Bl.7) and 
gathering like terms. The result is given by equation (B1.9). 
A4 = (1-5)C3 +(1 -6)^C2 +(1-5)'C, ++(l-5)''Co +(1 -5)^AO (Bl-9) 
The pattern that has been emerging in equations (B1.5), (Bl.7) and (B1.9) for At, in general, 
is summarized using summation notation in equation (Bl. 10). 
A, =X(l-5)'Q.i +(l-5)^Ao (Bl.lO) 
i=l 
In order to transform equation (Bl.lO) into the solution given by equation (3.5), a change of 
notation is employed. In equation (Bl.lO) let j=t-i. For i=l, j=t-I and for i=t, j=0. This gives 
rise to equation (Bl. 11). 
A,= XO-5r^Cj + (l-5)^Ao (Bl.ll) 
j=t-i 
Next, using the commutative property of addition, rewrite equation (Bl.ll) as equation 
(B1.12). 
A,=2(I-6)-iCi+(l-S)'A„ {B1.12) 
j=0 
110 
Replace j with i in equation (B1.12) to get equation (B1.13) which is the desired solution. 
At = S (1 - 5)'"'Ci + (1 - 5)' Ao (B1.13) 
i=0 
I l l  
APPENDIX C. 
SOLUTION TO THE DIFFERENCE EQUATION 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the details of the solution to the second-
order linear difference equation (3.46) which is discussed in Chapter 3. This equation is 
solved in accordance with the procedures outlined by Sargent (1979). The difference 
equation is reproduced here as equation (CI. 1) for the reader's convenience. 
Cj_i -aiCj_2 -ttjC, = +a3Pj_i (Cl.l) 
Before attempting to solve equation (Cl.l), it is useful to explore the relationship 
between ai and az. In particular, the expressions for these two coeflBcients are given by 
equations (3.22) and (3.23) which have been reproduced here as equations (CI.2) and (CI.3), 
respectively. 
' n*- n •• 
(CI.2) 
_ 1 r  /STT / I  AJlvU2v(l-<y)^ 
^ 1 (CI.3) 
Equation (CI.3) can be manipulated to show that az equals the product of (3 and ai as 
follows. Factor 3 out as a common term, and rewrite equation (CI.3) in terms of ai. This is 
demonstrated by equation (CI.4). 
0^2 =P 
n u, •• yy 
= |3a, (C1.4) 
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Solving the Difference Equation 
The solution of equation (Cl.l) will proceed in four broad steps. First, the 
homogeneous version of equation (Cl.l) will be solved to obtain the complementary function. 
Next, the particular integral will be obtained by solving the non-homogeneous version of 
equation (Cl.l). The general solution is generated by the simple sum of the complementary 
function and the particular integral. Finally, initial conditions will be used to determine the 
values of the exogenous constants in the general solution. The exogenous constants in the 
general solution will then be replaced by these values to generate the complete solution to 
equation (Cl.l). Finally, the appendix will consider a special assumption which enables one 
to proceed from the complete solution of equation (Cl.l) to the Becker et al. version of this 
solution. 
In keeping with Sargent (1979) to solve equation (Cl.l), the algebra of lag operators 
will be used. Begin by introducing h(t), an abbreviation for the exogenous variables on the 
right-hand side of equation (Cl.l), where h(t) is defined as in equation (CI. 5). 
(CI.5) 
The modified version of equation (Cl.l) is given by equation (CI.6). 
Ct_i aiCi_2 — h(t) (CI.6) 
Use equation (C1.4) to substitute out for 0.2 in equation(C 1.6). 
Ct-i-aiCi_2-3aiCj =h(t) (C1.7) 
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Next, equation (C1.7) will be expressed in lag-operator notation where the lag operator L" is 
defined in equation (CI.8). 
L"X,=X,_„ (C1.8) 
LC, - ttiL^C, - 3a,C, = h(t) (C1.9) 
Deriving the Complementary Function 
In keeping with Sargent, the complementary fimction is derived by solving the 
homogeneous version of equation (CI.9). This is given by the following equation; 
LCt - a,L^Ct - 3a,Cj = 0. (C1.10) 
The characteristic equation that corresponds to equation (CI. 10) is obtained by using the 
substitution stated in equation (C1.11). 
C, =<t)' (CI.11) 
Equations (C1.10) and (C1.11) yield the auxiliary equation given by equation (C1.12). 
(|)-ai(t)^-3aj = 0 (CI.12) 
The roots of this equation, <J)i and (}>2, are given by equations (Cl.13) and (CI. 14), 
respectively. 
, 1-Jl-4Pa? 
* ,  =  — i - L  ( C I .  1 3 )  
2a, 
l + Jl-4Ba? 
• 2 = — ( C I . 1 4 )  
2ai 
The complementary function is given by equation (CI. 15) where Ai and A2 are exogenous 
constants that will be determined using initial conditions. 
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C^ — Aj(j)j 4-A2cj>2 (CI.15) 
Deriving the Particular Integral 
In keeping with Sargent, the particular integral is derived from solving the non-
homogeneous difference equation given by (C1.9) for C,. 
h(t) C . =  
(L-ttjL^ -Ptti) 
(CI.16) 
The strategy here is to manipulate the denominator in the right hand side of equation (CI. 16) 
to a stage where standard lag operator results can be invoked to express Ct as the weighted 
sum of the h(t) terms, where the weights are given by the two roots 4)1 and (1)2. 
The denominator in the right hand side of equation (CI. 16) is a quadratic in L. The 
following fact about a quadratic form given by equation (Cl.17) can be used to transform 
equation (C1.16) into equation (C1.18). 
L +bL + c= (L-(j)j)(L-(()2) = i - ^  
<\>iJ \ (j)2 
Ct = h(t) 
ai(|)i(|)j i - i  
<i)i/ 
i - i  
(Cl.17) 
(CI.18) 
The roots (j)i and ^2are given by equations (CI. 13) and (CI. 14), respectively. Next, consider 
the following notational changes; 
<1)1--
Pi 
(CI. 19) 
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^ 2 ^  
P2 
(CI.20) 
Next, use equations (CI. 19) and (CI.20) to rewrite equation (CI. 18) as equation (Cl.21) 
h(t) C . =  
-a. 
^ 1 ^ 
(C1.2I) 
vPlP2^ 
(l-PiL)(l-pX) 
In order to bring some standard lag operator results to bear, equation (Cl.21) needs to be 
manipulated once more. This is done by using an algebraic equivalence given by (C1.22) to 
rewrite equation (C1.21) as equation (CI.23). 
1 P-, I Pi ^ "(PiL)"' ^ 
(l pjL^^l PjL) (P2 Pi)(l P2^) (Pi Pi)vl~(PiL) 
(C1.22) 
r - P1P2 
— 
P2 
oti  (P2-P1) 
h(t) 
(1-P2L) 
P1P2 Pi 
(Pz-Pi) 
-(PiL)-^h(t) 
1-(P,L)-' . (C1.23) 
Next, two lag operator results from Sargent are stated as equations (C1.24) and (CI.25). 
T^ = Zpih(t-j) 
I-P2L S 
(CI.24) 
h(t) 
l-PiL 
-(PiL)-^h(t) 
l-(PiL)-' 
h(t + j) (CI.25) 
Equations (CI.24) and (CI.25) are used to convert equation (CI.23) into equation (C1.26). 
^p.pi Pz Vpjhd-jj + P'P' P' 
(Pl-P2)j=0 ttl  (P1-P2) 
h(t + j) (CI.26) 
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Finally, use equations (CI.19) and (C1.20) to substitute out for pi and pi in equation (C1.26). 
This yields equation (CI.27) which is the required particular integral. 
Q = 1 
'I' l)  j=0 
Z w - j )  1 
ai(j)i(<t>2-<l>i) IWt + j) Lj=i 
(C1.27) 
Deriving the General Solution 
The general solution to equation (CI.I) is obtained by summing the complementary 
function from equation (CI. 15) and the particular integral from equation (CI.27). The 
general solution is given by equation (CI.28). 
Ct - Ai(j)j + A2(j)2 + 1 
'I' l)  j=0 
I W - j )  1 
.j=> 
(CI .28) 
Obtaining the Complete Solution using Initial Conditions 
In keeping with Becker et al., the complete solution to equation (CI. I) is obtained by 
invoking the following assumptions; 
00 = ^ 
A 2  = 0  
h(-s) = 0 V s > 0. 
(CI.29) 
(Cl.30) 
(CI.31) 
Equation (CI.29) pins down the value of C at time zero (i.e., it specifies the initial amount of 
cigarette consumption). Equation (Cl.30) eliminates the larger root (J)2 from the solution. 
Equation (C1.31) assumes that the values of the exogenous variables prior to the initial time 
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period do not have any bearing on the solution. Equations (C1.28), (C1.29) and (C1.30) yield 
equation (Cl.32). 
A,=  ^ X<i>ih(j)l (Cl.32) 
When equation (Cl.32) is used to substitute out for At in equation (C1.28), the complete 
solution to equation (CI. 1) is obtained. This complete solution is given by equation (C 1.33). 
z' \ 
1 ^ 1 . ,  1 C. = C° -• I<t)ih(j) 4)1 + 
'i'i)j=o S<l>2'h(t-j) 
1 
I«t + j) 
.i=' 
(C1.33) 
Obtaining the Becker et al. Solution to the Difference Equation 
The Becker et al. solution to equation (Cl.l) can be obtained from equation (C1.33) 
with the additional assumption that is given by equation (CI.34). 
P = 1  ( C 1 . 3 4 )  
If the rate of time preference p is assumed to equal one, then in this special case alone will the 
solution to equation (Cl.l) take the Becker et al. form. Assuming that 3 equals one is 
equivalent to assuming that the roots (|)i and (j)2are reciprocal in nature. The product of (j)! and 
(t)2 can be obtained by considering equations (C1.13) and (C 1.14). 
<I>i4>2= —= 3 (C1.35) 
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It is clear from equation (CI.35) that only in the special case of 3=1, will the roots (J)i and (j)2 
be reciprocal in nature. It is only under this special assumption that equation (C1.33) can be 
rewritten as the Becker et al. solution given by equation (CI.36). 
I Ct = c°- 1 
ai<f)i(<t)2 j=i <l>l) j=0 Z W - j )  
1 
Z W t + j )  
i=i 
(CI.3 6) 
Assuming that P=1 has the economic implication of the agent weighting her utility from ali 
time periods equally. It is only under this very restrictive assumption that the Becker et al. 
solution is obtained. 
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APPENDIX D. 
COMPUTATION OF REGRESSION CONSTANTS 
The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the process of recovering the intercept term 
for each state in a given year. Furthermore, as an example, the appendix will provide a 
summary of the state and time dummies from regression (iv) in Table 5.4. Finally, the 
implications of the increasing amount of publicity concerning the cigarette industry in recent 
years will be discussed. 
Table Dl.l presents a summary of the constant term and the state and time dummies 
from regression (iv) from Table 5.4 (in Chapter 5). Given that the data set is both cross-
sectional across states and is comprised of a time-series across the years 1955-1994, a fixed 
effects model is used. A dummy variable is included for every state except the state of 
Alabama, and a dummy varizible is included for every year except the year 1957. Despite the 
fact that data from 1955-1957 are available, the regression uses values from 1957-1994 
because the tax and price instruments include taxes and prices with a two-period lag. 
The default constant corresponds to the intercept for the state of Alabama in the year 
1957. The constant term for any state in any given year is simply the sum of the default 
constant plus the coeflBcients of the state and time dummies for the year in question. For 
example, the constant term for the state of Iowa in the year 1958 is given by the sum of the 
default constant, 59.250, plus the coefiBcient of the Iowa state dummy, 0.170 plus the 
coeflBcient of the time dummy for 1958, 1.411. 
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These state and time dummies are included in an eflfort to control for state and time 
specific eflfects that may be present. In recent years the tobacco industry has been the focus of 
close scrutiny by the media. In the process there has been a lot of publicity about the health 
dangers of consuming cigarettes. These eflfects are picked up by the time specific dummies, 
and it is interesting to note that the coeflficients of the time specific dummies switch signs fi-om 
positive to negative in 1984. Unfortunately, these coeflBcients are not significantly diflferent 
fi-om zero at the five percent level. 
Table D1.1 State and Time Dummy CoefiBcients from Regression (iv) 
Category Variable CoeflBcient (T-ratio) 
(State/Year) Name 
Alabama CONSTANT 59.250 (8.414) 
Alaska DUM2 2.734 (1.309) 
Arizona DUM4 -1.683 (-1.227) 
Arkansas DUM5 3.376 (2.529) 
California DUM6 0.608 -0.441 
Colorado DUM8 -1.770 (-1.100) 
Connecticut DUM9 4.259 (2.099) 
Delaware DUMIO -2.166 (-0.945) 
District of Columbia DUMII 17.018 (5.933) 
Florida DUMI2 8.743 (5.069) 
Georgia DUM13 2.395 (1.786) 
Hawaii DUM15 -15.922 (-6.85) 
Idaho DUM16 -6.820 (-4.619) 
Illinois DUM17 4.982 (2.847) 
Indiana DUM18 3.567 (2.294) 
Iowa DUM19 0.170 -0.123 
Kansas DUM20 -0.769 (-0.545) 
Kentucky DUM21 -7.606 (-2.71) 
Louisiana DUM22 5.160 (3.677) 
Maine DUM23 8.091 (5.045) 
Maryland DUM24 1.623 -0.965 
Massachusetts DUM25 6.694 (3.731) 
Michigan DUM26 5.483 (3.391) 
Minnesota DUM27 0.919 -0.637 
Mississippi DUM28 -0.479 (-0.366) 
Missouri DUM29 2.955 (1.988) 
Montana DUM30 -0.901 (-0.671) 
Nebraska DUM31 -1.774 (-1.273) 
Nevada DUM32 21.519 (7.309) 
New Hampshire DUM33 30.119 (7.322) 
New Jersey DUM34 6.842 (3.409) 
Table D1.1 (Continued) 
Category Variable Coefficient (T-ratio) 
(State/Year) Name 
New Mexico DUM35 -8.194 (-5.320) 
New York DUM36 3.537 (1.996) 
North Carolina DUM37 -10.088 (-2.627) 
North Dakota DUM38 -4.643 (-3.310) 
Ohio DUM39 4.524 -2.930 
Oklahoma DUM40 3.449 (2.513) 
Oregon DUM41 3.389 (2.089) 
Pennsylvania DUM42 3.803 (2.498) 
Rhode Island DUM44 7.187 (4.129) 
South Carolina DUM45 0.270 -0.211 
South Dakota DUM46 -4.698 (-3.386) 
Tennessee DUM47 5.299 (3.696) 
Texas DUM48 0.900 -0.645 
Utah DUM49 -17.316 (-7.755) 
Vermont DUM50 9.197 (5.188) 
Virginia DUM51 -5.550 (-3.267) 
Washington DUM53 -3.917 (-2.361) 
West Virginia DLJM54 4.012 -2.830 
Wisconsin DUM55 0.238 -0.171 
Wyoming DUM56 3.527 (2.245) 
1958 D58 1.411 (1.086) 
1959 D59 6.321 (4.739) 
I960 D60 4.836 (3.496) 
1961 D61 7.517 (5.671) 
1962 D62 5.556 (4.083) 
1963 D63 5.846 (4.476) 
1964 D64 1.969 (1.481) 
1965 D65 4.752 (3.578) 
1966 D66 4.612 (3.306) 
1967 D67 3.791 (2.735) 
1968 D68 1.157 -0.799 
1969 D69 2.094 (1.465) 
Table D 1.1 (Continued) 
Category 
(State/Year) 
Variable 
Name 
CoefBcient (T-ratio) 
1970 D70 0.449 -0.298 
1971 D71 4.147 (2.508) 
1972 D72 6.266 (3.665) 
1973 D73 3.173 (1.797) 
1974 D74 3.421 (1.963) 
1975 D75 1.632 -0.931 
1976 D76 5.410 (3.072) 
1977 D77 1.073 -0.608 
1978 D78 1.639 -0.890 
1979 D79 1.571 -0.354 
1980 D80 1.360 -0.313 
1981 D81 1.225 -0.288 
1982 D82 1.337 -0.315 
1983 D83 0.774 -0.178 
1984 D84 -1.473 (-0.331) 
1985 D85 -0.062 (-0.014) 
1986 D86 -0.176 (-0.039) 
1987 D87 -0.440 (-0.096) 
1988 D88 -1.483 (-0.321) 
1989 D89 -1.677 (-0.356) 
1990 D90 -2.943 (-0.610) 
1991 D91 -2.822 (-0.581) 
1992 D92 -1.069 (-0.210) 
1993 D93 -1.077 (-0.208) 
1994 D94 -4.895 (-1.006) 
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APPENDIX E. 
SIMULATIONS 
According to Glantz et al. (1995), the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company was 
aware of the addictive effects of nicotine as early as 1962. They go on to state that this 
information was not revealed to the public until the Surgeon General's report of 1979. 
Several states, including the state of Iowa, are currently suing various tobacco firms for 
violating consumer fraud statutes which require the producer to disclose any adverse effects 
that their products may have on the consumer. If the Brown and Williamson Tobacco 
Company had chosen to comply with the consumer fraud statutes, this information would 
probably have been released by 1963. The purpose of this appendix is to simulate the effects 
of the release of addiction information in 1963 on cigarette consumption from 1963 to 1987. 
The next section will briefly discuss the theoretical assumptions under which the simulations 
were performed. It will also briefly describe the theoretical equation used to perform the 
simulations. Next, the regression coefBcients that are used in the simulations will be reported. 
The following section will outline the operationaiization of the theoretical solution. The 
subsequent section will report a representative selection of simulation results and discuss their 
economic implications. The appendix concludes with some of the limitations of the approach 
used to conduct these simulations. 
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The Theoretical Basis of the Simulations 
The simulations are performed using the closed form solution to the (demand) 
difference equation that is derived in APPENDIX C. The solution is given by equation 
(CI.33). This equation is reproduced here for the reader's convenience as equation (El. 1). 
c, = A|j.!-FA,i|i;.t- ' ' |;,|)ih(t+j) (Ei.i) 
*i^l) j=0 *t*l) j=l 
(J)i and (j)2 are the roots of the difference equation given by equation (CLIO). Ai and A2 are 
constants that are to be determined using initial conditions. The solution presented in 
equation (El.l) is entirely composed of exogenous variables. However, this equation is not 
suitable for the purposes of simulation because the empirical estimates (which will be 
described in a later section) yield an unstable value of (j)2. The estimate of <1)2 inferred from the 
regression parameters is greater than unity. Thus, as the value of t increases, (j)2 will explode 
to plus infinity. This results in simulated solutions of Ct either going to plus infinity or to 
minus infinity depending upon the sign of A2. However, the regression estimates do yield a 
stable value of <t)i. In order to obtain reasonable estimates from the simulations, the set of 
solutions defined by equation (ELI) is limited to the subset of stable solutions. In other 
words, the unstable root <j)2 is eliminated from the solution by assuming that A2=0. In 
addition, it is assumed that the values of the exogenous variables prior to the initial time 
period (t=0) do not effect the values of consumption at any time t (Ct). The formal statement 
of this assumption is provided by equation (CI.31). These two assumptions transform 
equation (El.l) into equation (EL2) which is used to perform the simulations. 
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r 
C, = C° 
V 
+ (E1.2) 
C° is the initial value of consumption, and h(t) is an abbreviation for the exogenous variables 
as defined in equation (CI.5). 
Estimates of the parameters that appear in equation (El.2) are inferred from the 
estimates of the regression coeflBcients. The specific model used for the purposes of these 
simulations is a rational addiction model without structural breaks that is estimated over the 
period 1979-1994. The use of a rational addiction model without structural breaks is based 
on the empirical findings (reported in Table 5.4) of a switch fi-om a myopic to a rational 
regime after the release of addiction information. The regression is run over the subset 1979-
1994 because the goal is to transport the consumption patterns that have evolved since the 
release of addiction information back to 1963. Table El.l reports the estimates fi'om model 
(iv). Model (iv) is chosen to perform the simulations because it contains the most exhaustive 
set of instruments. 
In order to use equation (El.2) to simulate historical values of consumption in the 
presence of addiction information, the estimates in Table El.l are used to infer estimates of 
the parameters in equation (El.2). Table (El.l) reports estimates of the rational addiction 
model without structural breaks for the period 1979-1994. Asymptotic t-ratios are in 
parentheses. The observed signs of the estimates of all the coefBcients conform to their 
Regression Estimates Used to Perform the Simulations 
Operationaiizing the Theoretical Solution 
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predicted directions which are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. All the variables except future 
consumption (Q^i) are significant at the one percent level of significance. Ci-i is significant at 
the five percent significance level. The value of ai is given by the estimate of the coefiBcient 
of Ct-i. The value of ai for the simulations is given by the estimate of the coefiBcient of Ct-i. 
(|)i and <J>2 are given by equations 
Table El.l Regression Estimates Used in the Simulations 
RHS CoefiBcient 
Variables (iv) 
Ct-i 0.389 
(5.07) 
Ci*i 0.206 
(2.524) 
Pi -29.065 
(-6.167) 
INCt 0.131 
(4.861) 
SDTIMPt -4.542 
(-2.652) 
SDTEXP, -82.766 
(-6.187) 
LDTAX, -64.759 
(-6.11) 
0.979 
P 0.530 
r 0.888 
N 788 
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(CI. 13) and (CI. 14) which are reproduced here as equations (El.3) and (EI.4) for the 
reader's convenience. Note that the value of <j)2 exceeds one, while the value of (|)i is less than 
one. In other words (()2 is the unstable root, and (J) i is the stable root. 
Equation (El.2) uses an infinite series in all the summations. However, theoretically 
speaking, (t){and go to zero after a large enough value of t is reached because (t)i is less 
than one and (j)2 is greater than one. Given the estimates in equations (El.3) and (El.4), (j)i 
raised to the fourth power is 0.00 and raised to the sixth power is 0.00. Each of the 
summations is taken over a horizon comprised of four time periods. The complete theoretical 
expression for h(t) is given by equation (C1.5). Its operationalized equivalent is given by 
equation (El.5). 
The constant term Oo varies across states and years. For any given state in any given 
year, it is given by the estimate of the default constant from the regression used plus the sum 
of the estimates of the coefBcients of the state and time dummies of the state and year in 
question. It is this difference among states that allows a separate consumption series to be 
simulated for each state. The estimates of the coefBcients as, etc, a?, ag, and Og are reported 
(EI.3) 
2.343351 (E1.4) 
h(t) = +a3P(_[ +agINCt_i +a7SDTlMPt_, +agSDTEXPj_, +a9LDTAX,_, 
(E1.5) 
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in Table (El.I) as the coefiBcients on Pn, INCt-i, SDITMPt-i, SDTEXPt-i and LDTAXt.i, 
respectively. The values for these exogenous variables themselves are taken from their 
respective data series in each state beginning in 1963. 
Simulation Results and Implications 
The above procedure was implemented for forty-one different states and the District 
of Columbia. Simulations were not performed for states with missing data. The average 
simulated values for the U.S. based on the forty-two simulations are reported in Table El.2. 
This table also reports the average per capita consumption levels that were actually observed 
across the forty-one states and the District of Columbia. In general average simulated series 
consumption is less than average observedconsumption. The average simulated values exceed 
the average observed consumption levels for the years 1963-1964 and 1968-1971. In general, 
the simulated consumption levels for most states exceeded the actual consumption levels for 
the years 1963-1964. However, for the years 1968-1971, most states had simulated 
consumption levels that were lower than the actual consumption levels in those states. There 
were a few states whose simulated levels greatly exceeded the actual consumption levels 
during these years. Thus, the U.S. average simulated consumption for the years 1968-1971 
exceeds actual average consumption due to the dominance of a few states. 
A representative sample of the simulations results from five states is presented in 
Tables El.3 through El.7. The fitted values based on model (iv) from Chapter 5 are included 
as a benchmark. The results for the state of Alabama are presented in Table El.3. The 
Alabama results are quite unique compared to the rest of the states because for the state of 
Alabama the simulated consumption series suggests that, on average, a release of addiction 
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information would lead to a level of consumption greater than the level of consumption 
observed in the absence of addiction information. This does not agree with the intuition that 
the release of addiction information would prompt people to smoke less because they would 
be afraid to get hooked. However, the state of Alabama is the only state in which simulated 
consumption exceeds actual consumption to such an extent. 
The majority of states (Tables El.4 -El.7) have simulated consumption series that 
indicate the level of consumption is reduced after the dissemination of addiction information. 
This .suggests that the release of addiction information causes people to smoke less than if 
they were unaware of the additive potential of cigarettes. Critics may argue that most 
smokers discover for themselves that cigarettes are addictive, and thus, the impact of 
addiction information is being overstated. However, this study contends that an addict who 
adjusts current consumption levels to compensate for the effects of past consumption need 
not necessarily consider the future implications of current consumption. On the other hand, if 
the agent is explicitly informed of the future consequences of current consumption, then a 
rational agent would pick his level of current consumption while keeping its future effects in 
mind. 
The simulation results must be interpreted with the following limitations in mind. The 
use of actual data from 1962-1987 for the exogenous variables assumes that if tobacco firms 
admitted that cigarettes were addictive they would not compensate in any way for this release 
of information. For example, using the historic price series suggests that cigarette firms 
would not compensate for the impact of addiction information on consumers by lowering 
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Table E1.2 Average Simulated Vs. Average Actual Consumption in the U.S. 
Year Average Average Difference'' 
Simulated Actual 
Consumption' Consumption* 
1963 133 127 6 
1964 125 123 2 
1965 124 125 -1 
1966 124 126 -2 
1967 124 126 -2 
1968 125 123 2 
1969 125 123 2 
1970 124 120 4 
1971 124 123 1 
1972 124 127 -3 
1973 127 129 -2 
1974 129 132 -3 
1975 130 133 -3 
1976 127 136 -9 
1977 125 136 -11 
1978 124 136 -12 
1979 125 134 -9 
1980 123 134 -11 
1981 125 135 -10 
1982 126 133 -7 
1983 122 128 -6 
1984 115 122 -7 
1985 113 121 -8 
1986 111 118 -7 
1987 111 115 -4 
' All consumption figures are reported in packs. 
""The Difference is computed by taking the difference 
between average simulated and average actual consumption. 
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Table E13 Simulated Vs. Actual Consumption in Alabama 
Year Fitted Simulated Actual Difference 
Consumption* Consimiption* Consumption' 
1963 98 121 94 27 
1964 95 119 95 24 
1965 100 120 99 21 
1966 100 119 96 23 
1967 99 119 96 23 
1968 92 115 88 27 
1969 90 114 90 24 
1970 89 112 90 22 
1971 92 112 95 17 
1972 100 116 101 15 
1973 103 120 103 17 
1974 108 124 108 16 
1975 110 126 112 14 
1976 116 123 116 7 
1977 117 123 117 6 
1978 118 123 123 0 
1979 124 125 121 4 
1980 123 122 123 -1 
1981 122 121 120 1 
1982 120 121 119 2 
1983 117 117 116 1 
1984 113 112 113 -1 
1985 113 109 115 -6 
1986 113 109 116 -7 
1987 112 110 114 -4 
* All consumption figures are reported in packs. 
""The Difference is computed by taking the difference 
between simulated and actual consumption. 
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Table E1.4 Simulated Vs. Actual Consumption in Connecticut 
Year Fitted Simulated Actual Difference 
Consumption* Consumption* Consumption* 
1963 149 149 156 -7 
1964 145 133 144 -11 
1965 145 134 147 -13 
1966 149 138 145 -7 
1967 149 143 146 -3 
1968 148 147 143 4 
1969 154 150 145 5 
1970 125 118 120 -2 
1971 114 103 118 -15 
1972 108 90 111 -21 
1973 106 89 109 -20 
1974 108 93 112 -19 
1975 111 97 110 -13 
1976 116 100 113 -13 
1977 116 102 117 -15 
1978 121 105 118 -13 
1979 117 109 117 -8 
1980 118 109 118 -9 
1981 117 110 116 -6 
1982 117 112 115 -3 
1983 115 no 114 -4 
1984 109 103 113 -10 
1985 108 101 111 -10 
1986 109 102 109 -7 
1987 106 105 109 -4 
* Ail consumption figures are reported in packs. 
'' The Difference is computed by taking the difference 
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Table E1.5 Simulated Vs. Actual Consumption in Iowa 
Year Fitted Simulated Actual Difference'' 
Consumption* Consumption* Consumption' 
1963 118 122 115 7 
1964 114 114 110 4 
1965 115 112 116 -4 
1966 114 108 108 0 
1967 110 105 114 -9 
1968 106 101 109 -8 
1969 106 101 108 -7 
1970 107 105 109 -4 
1971 111 107 108 -1 
1972 112 106 109 -3 
1973 113 110 111 -I 
1974 116 113 116 -3 
1975 119 115 121 -6 
1976 126 113 124 -11 
1977 125 111 126 -15 
1978 126 111 127 -16 
1979 125 113 124 -11 
1980 128 111 125 -14 
1981 123 113 133 -20 
1982 123 110 116 -6 
1983 115 104 116 -12 
1984 110 97 111 -14 
1985 108 94 109 -15 
1986 105 91 104 -13 
1987 101 89 101 -12 
' All consumption figures are reported in packs. 
^ The Difference is computed by taking the difference 
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Table E1.6 Simulated Vs. Actual Consumption in Kentucky 
Year Fitted Simulated Actual Diffe 
Consumption* Consumption' Consumption* 
1963 133 135 126 9 
1964 134 131 127 4 
1965 139 134 129 5 
1966 147 140 134 6 
1967 150 144 139 5 
1968 154 149 143 6 
1969 158 153 146 7 
1970 167 162 156 6 
1971 177 166 164 2 
1972 189 172 179 -7 
1973 197 176 202 -26 
1974 209 176 212 -36 
1975 211 172 223 -51 
1976 218 165 231 -66 
1977 217 160 229 -69 
1978 215 156 225 -69 
1979 209 154 215 -61 
1980 203 147 215 -68 
1981 201 145 210 -65 
1982 196 143 211 -68 
1983 189 138 201 -63 
1984 182 131 183 -52 
1985 177 129 182 -53 
1986 175 128 180 -52 
1987 175 130 171 -41 
' AH consumption figures are reported in packs. 
''The Difference is computed by taking the difference 
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Table E1.7 Simulated Vs. Actual Consumption in Minnesota 
Year Fitted Simulated Actual Difference'" 
Consumption* Consumption* Consumption* 
1963 108 114 113 1 
1964 109 107 105 2 
1965 108 108 109 -1 
1966 113 110 111 -1 
1967 114 112 114 -2 
1968 113 113 114 -1 
1969 115 114 112 2 
1970 108 109 104 5 
1971 108 108 116 -8 
1972 113 103 97 6 
1973 101 104 107 -3 
1974 109 106 111 -5 
1975 111 108 112 -4 
1976 117 106 117 -11 
1977 117 105 117 -12 
1978 119 106 119 -13 
1979 118 108 118 -10 
1980 120 107 118 -11 
1981 121 111 121 -10 
1982 120 114 119 -5 
1983 116 109 113 -4 
1984 111 102 111 -9 
1985 109 101 113 -12 
1986 108 96 104 -8 
1987 100 94 109 -15 
* All consumption figures are reported in packs. 
'' The Difference is computed by taking the difference 
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prices. In addition, these simulations are based upon the assumption that the release of 
addiction information by cigarette firms would not prompt any government policies designed 
to curb consumption. Also, it should be pointed out that the annual dummy coefficients for 
the years 1962 -1979 are not available because the regression is run on a subset of the data 
fi-om 1979-1994. This is equivalent to performing the simulations under the assumption that 
there were no significant annual effects in the years 1963-1979. This assumption is 
questionable because other studies by Warner (1977) and Hamilton (1972) suggest that health 
warnings by the Surgeon General in the early sixties would cause consumption to decrease. 
In light of this fact, one might argue that the release of addiction information may have caused 
a fiirther decrease in consumption and that the present simulations overstate the values of 
consimiption that may have been observed during the years 1963-1987. 
Clearly, these simulations have many limitations which need to be explored at a much 
greater depth before credible estimates in which one can place a great deal of confidence are 
obtained. However, the discussion of many of the problems associated with trying to simulate 
fi"om an unstable difference equation that is given in this study provides a starting point for 
possible fiirther research into this issue. 
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APPENDIX F 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Table Fl.l Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
Ct 
P t  
INCt 
SDTIMPt 
SDTEXP, 
LDTAXt 
INFO 
Per capita cigarette consumption in packs in fiscal year t as obtained 
fi-om state cigarette excise tax-paid sales. 
Average retail price of year t and t-1 as reported in November of each 
year in 1982-84 dollars. 
Average of per capita income in year t and t-1 in 1982-84 dollars. 
Index which measures casual (import) smuggling incentives . This index 
is a weighted average of the tax differential between the importing state 
and the surrounding lower tax states, with weights based on the border 
populations. A computational formula is given by equation (4.5). 
Index which measures casual (export) smuggling incentives . This index 
is a weighted average of the tax differential between the exporting state 
and the surrounding lower tax states, with weights based on the border 
populations. A computational formula is given by equation (4.6). 
Index which measures the incentives to commercially smuggle cigarettes 
fi-om Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina to any state with a lower 
cigarette excise tax rate within a thousand miles. This index is positively 
related to the difference between the state's excise tax and the excise 
taxes of the long-distance exporting states. The computational formulas 
are given by equations (4.7), (4.8) and (4.11). 
A structural break dummy variable which takes on a value of zero for the 
years 1955 -1978 and one for the years 1979-1994. 
Ti 
POP; 
The annual state cigarette excise-tax in state i in 1982-84 dollars. 
The annual intercensal estimate of population in state i. 
The border population of state i living within twenty miles of state j. 
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Table Fl.l (continued) 
Variable Description 
2 A weight that is positively related to the ratio of the value added from 
tobacco production in the state of North Carolina to the sum of the value 
added from tobacco production in the states of North Carolina and 
Virginia. A computational formula is provided by equation (4.9). 
2 A weight that is positively related to the ratio of the value added from 
tobacco production in the state of Virginia to the sum of the value added 
from tobacco production in the states of North Carolina and Virginia. A 
computational formula is provided by equation (4.9). 
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